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INTRODUCTION
AWYERS for children in child protective proceedings in the
.LdUnited States must reconceive their role and their responsibilities.
While lawyers for juveniles in delinquency and quasi-criminal matters
have been understood, since In re Gault' in 1967, to provide tradi-
tional legal representation for their clients, a lawyer for a minor in a
child protective proceeding has generally been expected to play the
role of guardian ad litem with respect to his clients. As guardian ad
litem, the child's lawyer determines the child's best interests, and rep-
resents those interests through advocacy and testimony before the
court.
The book Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings:
Ethical and Practical Dimensions, of which this Article forms two
chapters, reviews, rejects, and replaces that guardian ad litem role.
Through historical,2 statutory,3 and ethical4 analysis, the book demon-
strates that the guardian ad litem role for lawyers for children has out-
lived its historical usefulness. Because it requires lawyers to make
decisions which they are not qualified to make, and because it de-
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Chapter One of Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings: Ethi-
cal and Practical Dimensions offers historical background concerning the history of
child protection and parental rights. It concludes that, despite federal and national
initiatives designed to preserve families, the current child welfare system is disturb-
ingly continuous with what scholars have described as a dual system of family law,
protecting parental rights of rich parents and discounting parental prerogative of poor
parents, which originated in Elizabethan England. Chapter TWo offers a capsule his-
tory of lawyering for children in the United States. It concludes that the prevalent
"guardian ad litem" role of lawyers for children originated in property disputes in-
volving orphaned wealthy British children and has no logical place in contemporary
child welfare proceedings. jean Koh Peters, Representing Children in Child Protec-
tive Proceedings: Ethical and Practical Dimensions (forthcoming from the Michie
Company) [hereinafter Representing Children].
3. Chapter Three of Representing Children reviews the substantive law of the 50
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories regarding the role of lawyers
for children in child welfare proceedings. Although lawyers for children or guardians
ad litem are required in all jurisdictions, the role of any given lawyer in any given
state, city, county, or courthouse varies wildly, with few areas of consensus or consis-
tent practice. Id.
4. Chapter Four of Representing Children examines the ethical provisions regard-
ing representation of children. Concluding that lawyers for children are ethically re-
quired to design a representation that closely resembles traditional lawyer-adult client
representation, the chapter offers three default postures for the child's attorney and
seven principles for keeping the attorney true to the ethical requirements. Id.
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prives children of the traditional competencies of a good legal repre-
sentative, the guardian ad litem'role doubly disadvantages child clients
and should be abandoned.
The book thus tries to answer the central question facing lawyers
for children: How do lawyers for children represent children in a
lawyerly way, one that is deeply respectful of the individuality and
unique perspectives of the client? I recommend that lawyers for chil-
dren be guided in their role by the letter and spirit of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") Rule 1.14, which provides:
a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether be-
cause of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal cli-
ent-lawyer relationship with the client.
b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the
client's own interest.5
In Chapter Four, I argue that Rule 1.14, despite its broad and flexible
language, offers useful guidance to the lawyer for children. The
child's attorney can understand the rule in terms of three practical
defaults for action in his representation of his client. These defaults
are:
1. the relationship default-the lawyer must meet and get to know
his client.
2. the competency default-the lawyer should initially presume
some level of competency for his client on each issue in the rep-
resentation in which a client's point of view would ordinarily be
sought.
3. the advocacy default-the lawyer should initially attempt to ad-
vocate for the position expressed by his client.
The lawyer may deviate from these default positions only when in-
dependent evidence, that is, evidence not arising exclusively within
the lawyer-client relationship, such as psychological, educational, and
psychiatric evaluations, demonstrate that the default position is erro-
neous, and that deviation from the default position would clearly ben-
efit the child.
Without a consensus about these default positions, the danger in the
discretion inherent in Rule 1.14 lies in the following scenario. In
traditional lawyer-client relationships, lawyers are constrained to fol-
low the wishes of their clients when they are convinced that those
wishes are based on information and thorough legal counseling. The
lawyer may not override those wishes, even if he is convinced that
5. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
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they are wrong-headed. Clients, not lawyers, set the objectives of
their legal representations.6
The danger arises when the lawyer for a child or a person with a
disability takes Rule 1.14(b) as a license to overrule a client's stated
wishes, simply because the lawyer disagrees with the client's well-
counseled decision. In this undesirable scenario, the lawyer would re-
tain the final trump card in any decision-making process. If the client,
after careful counseling, reaches the decision that the lawyer favors,
the lawyer can congratulate herself for operating under Rule 1.14(a)
and retaining a clear conscience. If the client, after careful counseling,
reaches a decision that the lawyer thinks is foolish and that the lawyer
has advised the client is foolish, the lawyer can use that decision as
evidence for her "reasonable" belief that the "client cannot ade-
quately act in the client's own interest" and represent what the lawyer
considers to be the "right" decision rather than the client's stated
desires.7
Because this kind of circular, lawyer-centric thinking epitomizes the
inadequacies of the guardian ad litem model and fundamentally ex-
cludes the child client from the representation, this profession must
reject it. The central theme of the defaults is this: a lawyer for chil-
dren should start by trying to have a conventional professional rela-
tionship with her client. Only after the lawyer has determined,
through independent evidence and her own observations, that crucial
elements of the conventional lawyer-client relationship cannot be
maintained, should the relationship be modified.To be sure, a lawyer for children must acknowledge that, for many
of her clients, these defaults will not hold. I firmly believe, and the
book is designed to demonstrate, however, that lawyers can and must
individualize every representation, in a way that allows the maximum
possible participation of the client so that the representation reflects the
uniqueness of each child client.
The conceptual change that I am suggesting may be understood in
the following way. Posit a spectrum in which a fully competent, in-
volved, adult client contributes 100% to his representation-by pro-
viding information, listening to counseling, providing direction for the
representation, and expressing opinions about substantive and proce-
dural choices to be made. Traditional thinking about lawyering for
anything but this fully competent client suggests that competency is a
light switch-on or off: if the client cannot contribute 100%, the cli-
6. Id Rule 1.2(a).
7. Kate Federle warns in her paper for this Conference that giving lawyers discre-
tion to determine client competence invites manipulation when lawyer and client disa-
gree. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655,
1661, 1676-77, 1681; see also infra note 34 (discussing results when lawyer and client
disagree).
15091996]
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ent should not be expected to contribute at all. At that point, the
lawyer is free to determine the goals and methods of representation
with total discretion.9
I believe, however, that every client can contribute some amount to
his lawyer's representation. Even the newborn child evinces a person-
ality, a level of health, physical characteristics, a gestational and birth
history, and a family context and history that distinguishes her from
the next newborn client. 10 While this uniqueness may provide, per-
haps, only eighteen or twenty-six percent of what the lawyer requires
to determine how to represent the child, the lawyer's representation
must reflect this contribution, and remain true to its individuality.
Competency, in this context, is a dimmer switch: the client can shed
light on some aspects of the representation, even though she cannot
participate in all of it. The lawyer must strive to incorporate every
percentage of the client's contribution into the representation. Thus, I
would suggest that a lawyer whose client can contribute thirty percent
to the representation, but who assumes that the client can only con-
tribute fifteen percent, is failing to represent her client to a significant
degree."
8. Martha Matthews notes a tension in the Model Rules between a view of com-
petence as an incremental concept and competence as an all-or-nothing concept. On
the one hand, the Comment to Model Rule 1.14 notes that the "law recognizes inter-
mediate degrees of competence." Model Rules, supra note 5, Rule 1.14 cmt. On the
other hand, Model Rule 1.14(b) authorizes protective action which may remove en-
tirely the client's ability to direct the representation. Matthews notes that the Model
Rules drafters acknowledge, but do not resolve, this tension. Martha Matthews, Ten
Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action
Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1435, 1439-40 (1996).
The all-or-nothing view is expressed in Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes,
The Law of Lawyering § 1.14:101, at 439 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993): "At some point,
however, the ability of a disabled client to communicate or to take action is so limited
that assigning that person the role of "client" is a mere formality-as where a lawyer
has been assigned to represent a newborn infant."
9. For general background on the traditional role of the guardian ad litem, see
Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child The
Guardian Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 16, 25-35 (1977).
10. Peter Margulies in his article for this Conference, notes that because "even
infants are taking in information, and giving it out, at a spectacular rate," attorneys
for very young children should not forego meeting their clients. Peter Margulies, The
Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473,
1484 n.38 (1996).
11. In this regard, I agree with the Council of the Family Law Section of the ABA,
which states in its proposed Standards of Practice that client disability is not globally
determined, but rather is "contextual, incremental, and may be intermittent," and that
"[t]herefore, a child may be able to determine some positions in [a] case but not
others." Proposed American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 Fain. L.Q. 375, § B-3 cmt. (1995)
[hereinafter ABA Proposed Standards]. For a discussion of competence as a contin-
gent construct that varies with the decisions the client confronts and with the way the
client is treated by lawyers and other professionals, see Margulies, supra note 10, at
1477, 1485. See also Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Mis-
perceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1699, 1739-41 (1996) (argu-
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Of course, these percentages are artificial and imprecise, but they
are useful to conceptualize what lawyers for children already know.
In fact, child clients are unique individuals from the day that they are
born. In practice, however, especially high-volume, low-paid prac-
tices, client representations have had a disturbing cookie-cutter same-
ness. We assume a great deal about our clients without getting to
know them, we slot clients whom we have just begun to represent into
categories, and we participate in extraordinarily important decisions
in the child's life with extraordinarily little information. This Article
attempts to outline the concrete steps a truly individualized represen-
tation requires, so that the sophistication of our representation of
child clients can reflect the gravity of the family decisions in that we
participate.
To double check the lawyer's actions and their harmony with Rule
1.14, Chapter Four of Representing Children also sets forth the follow-
ing seven questions to keep lawyers for children honest:
(1) In making decisions about the representation, am I seeing the
case, as much as I can, from my client's point of view, rather
than from an adult's point of view?
(2) Does the child understand as much as I can explain about what is
happening in his case?
(3) If my client were an adult, would I be taking the same actions,
making the same decisions and treating her in the same way?
(4) If I decide to treat my client differently from the way I would treat
an adult in a similar situation, in what ways will my client con-
cretely benefit from that deviation? Is that benefit one which I
can explain to my client?
(5) Is it possible that l am making decisions in the case for the gratifi-
cation of the adults in the case, and not for the child?
(6) Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for my own
gratification, and not for that of my client?
(7) Does the representation, seen as a whole, reflect what is unique
and idiosyncratically characteristic of this child?
These questions memorialize my concern that, when lawyers are
asked to exercise broad discretion over their client's lives, filling in,
for example, the seventy percent that the infant client cannot provide
to the representation, adult concerns and the lawyer's own needs will
tend to fill the vacuum. Representation of very young and nonverbal
clients can and ought to resemble the child's perspective and not those
of the adults around him.
ing that even a traditional guardian ad litem need not under Model Rule 1.14,
conclude that "the entire normal client-lawyer relationship" is not possible, but must
preserve the normal relationship as much as possible). Buss points out that even
under Model Rule 1.14 "client capacity for decision making and for being informed
are quite different." Id. at 1749-50. This is one example of the need for contingent
and intermediate determinations of client capacity, rather than a single global deter-
mination to govern the entire relationship.
15111996]
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The Chapters included here address the roles and content of best
interests in lawyering for children. As a practitioner, I knew that I
was deeply uncomfortable with the "guardian ad litem" orientation of
much of my practice, and hoped that a strictly "advocacy-oriented"
child's lawyer, as described above, could largely avoid the responsibil-
ity of contending with her client's best interests. Further examination
of the ethical codes as well as my experience as a supervisor and
teacher, however, have convinced me that, not only must lawyers for
children be expected and required to understand and act on their cli-
ent's best interests,' 2 but in fact all lawyers are expected and required
to do so. Thus, even as I lay out a "client-directed" role for children's
lawyers in the book, I must explain how the principled lawyer for chil-
dren factors best interests into his representation, aid how he deter-
mines the content of best interests.
Thus, Chapter Five 13 - identifies the roles that best interests play in
even the most child-directed lawyer's representation. Chapter Six'4
describes prevailing views of how an attorney should determine those
best interests, and then presents a model integrating those views.
These chapters follow in their entirety.
Part One of the book concludes with a discussion of interdiscipli-
nary consultation and learning as well as sample representations of
two clients.' 5 Part Two of Representing Children outlines the practical
application of the principles presented in Part One through an in-
depth look at the lawyer-child client relationship.' 6 The book con-
12. It is fair to say that I was led, kicking and screaming, to this rather uncomforta-
ble conclusion. As a practitioner, I found the responsibility of taking positions on
huge issues in my client's life to be awesome and humbling. As a teacher and supervi-
sor, I found the level of discretion entrusted to lawyers for children to be frighteningly
huge. When undertaking the project of writing this book, I originally believed that I
could enunciate a view of lawyering that would eliminate the discretion to determine
and contend with a child's best interests altogether. I am therefore deeply sympa-
thetic with and fascinated by Martin Guggenheim's work, including the article in-
cluded with this Conference, which seeks principled elimination of lawyerly discretion
in representing children. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role
of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399 (1996). The chapters contained
herein demonstrate my conclusion, based upon my practice and my research, that
while this discretion, and the awesome responsibility it entails, cannot be eliminated,
it can nevertheless be reduced to acceptable levels and exercised in a principled
manner.
13. Presented in part I infra.
14. Presented in part II infra.
15. Chapter Seven of Representing Children discusses the roles of interdisciplinary
consultation and learning. Chapter Eight, which concludes Part One, outlines the
nuts and bolts of representing verbal and non-verbal clients, offering a practical
roadmap through the representations of various kinds of clients.
16. Part Two of Representing Children describes in depth a rubric for the relation-
ship of the adult attorney with the child client, addressing issues of interviewing, coun-
seling, and beginning and ending the professional relationship.
1512 [Vol. 64
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cludes with a discussion of selected issues in representing a child client
in various fora in Part Three.
17
I. TiE ROLES OF BEST INTERESTS IN LAWYERING FOR CHILDREN
Resolving that, wherever possible, the lawyer will represent her
child client through as traditional a lawyer-client relationship as possi-
ble does not relieve the lawyer of the obligation to confront and deter-
mine her client's best interests in a number of contexts. This part will
identify the roles of best interests in lawyering for children.
All lawyers for children must develop a sophisticated understanding
of the best interests of each client in order to carry out their represen-
tation for three reasons: (1) the ultimate legal standard governing the
client's case will often require a determination by a fact finder of best
interests; (2) all conversations with other professionals in the case,
whether in preparing litigation or seeking settlement, win be framed
by their concern for your client's best interests; and (3) the logistics of
representing children require lawyers to make choices based on their
clients' best interests on a daily basis. Lawyers who can meaningfully
counsel their child clients must understand best interests for two more
reasons: they are permitted and encouraged to counsel the client
about the client's best interests in assisting the client in making deci-
sions directing the representation; and, in addition, responsible lawy-
ering for these clients requires a lawyer to confront his assessment of a
client's best interests, to ensure that bias and personal values have not
assumed too important a role in the representation. Lawyers who
cannot meaningfully counsel their child clients must understand best
interests also, for the most daunting reason of all: they will be re-
quired to determine the goals of the representation, and a myriad of
other decisions for their clients, with relatively little client input.
The following list of roles for best interests in the representation of
child clients is meant to be exclusive and narrow. It excludes other
determinations of best interests in the relationship because lawyers for
children should wherever possible defer to their client's expressed
statements about a matter rather than determine independently what
they think is best for their clients. In addition, each moment in the
representation when best interests is implicated should be approached
as a narrow event, allowing the lawyer as little leeway as possible in
conceiving a view of best interests unrelated to the child's views.
Even a determination of best interests must begin and end with the
child in her context and the child's expressed views. Thus, this list of
roles of best interests must not be seen as carte blanche to override a
child's point of view. Rather, lawyers at these moments in the repre-
17. Part Three of Representing Children examines selected issues in pursuing the
representation, including lawyering at interdisciplinary meetings, and calling the child
client to the stand as a witness. Id.
15131996]
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sentation must recognize the responsibility and danger of losing track
of the child client that inheres in these small and large invitations to
lawyer discretion. Each of these roles of best interests will be consid-
ered in turn.
A. Best Interests As a Looming Legal Standard in the Case
Courts in the dispositional phase of an abuse, neglect, or depen-
dency proceeding must generally determine the child's best interests
to resolve the proceeding. 18 Similarly, best interests is usually the
standard in the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights
proceeding. In other stages of proceedings, for instance, the emer-
gency removal phase of a dependency proceeding or interim visitation
decisions, best interests may be one important factor among others.19
In keeping with the lawyer's duty to approach this moment of best
interests determination narrowly, it is critical to note that while best
interests lurks at any potential dispositional phase of child protective
proceedings, the child's lawyer may, pursuant to his client's instruc-
tions or otherwise, seek to resolve the case at the adjudicative phase,
at which the standard is parental unfitness. Often, a child's attorney
will conclude that moving to prevent an adjudication of parental unfit-
ness and thus end the case will best achieve the client's objectives.
This is particularly true when the client clearly wants the lawyer to
oppose further state intervention of any kind into her family. In these
instances, therefore, a child's lawyer may well decide to attempt to
focus .the parties and the court exclusively on questions relating to the
existence or absence of parental unfitness, and not on the sprawling
question of best interests.20
18. Donald Duquette notes that best interests remains the most common standard
for dispositional orders despite widespread dissatisfaction with the standard's subjec-
tivity. Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United
States and Great Britain, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 239, 279 (1992). For examples from just
two states, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129(e)(3) (1995) (requiring court to make best
interest determination for extension of child's commitment to state custody); id. § 51-
165(d) (1985 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that all judges assigned to Superior Court Juve-
nile Matters have a full understanding of the best interests of the child standard);
Conn. R. Super. Ct. Juv. § 1023.1(f)(2) (West 1995) (defining "dispositive hearing" as
a proceeding in which the court "orders whatever action is in the best interests of the
child and the community"); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 614(1)(e) (McKinney 1983) (requir-
ing neglect petitions to allege that best interests of child requires commitment to state
care); id. § 1052(b)(i)(A) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996) (requiring court in neglect
cases to state grounds for all dispositions in terms of child's best interest); id.
§ 1055(b)(iv)(B)(1-3) (setting out three factors court shall consider in determining
whether extension of commitment is in child's best interests).
19. Generally the standard in those proceedings is imminent harm to the child if
there is no removal. Many courts may believe that a finding of imminent danger
requires a general assessment of the interests of the child at the time.
20. Certainly the child's attorney should feel comfortable holding the state to its
burden demonstrate parental unfitness before further state intervention into the fain-
fly's life. Likewise, at an emergency removal hearing, an attorney opposing removal
1514 [Vol. 64
ROLES OF BEST INTERESTS
Despite her best efforts to keep the court focused upon adjudica-
tory matters, however, a lawyer may find that she is fighting a losing
battle. As a result of the prevalence of the "best interests" standard,
judges will often be preoccupied throughout all phases of all proceed-
ings with the "best interests of the child," even when, at a given phase
of the proceeding, another standard, such as parental fault, is control-
ling. At this point, the lawyer may decide that she must battle on two
fronts: seeking to focus on parental unfitness to the greatest extent
possible, and formulating a theory of best interests. Thus, any child
advocate must become adept at translating her proposals to the court
into the language of "best interests." Just as a tort attorney must
translate a client's story into the legal language of fault and negli-
gence, children's attorneys must often translate their clients' desires
and goals into the framework of "best interests." Like any attorney
who respects the client's right to make her own informed decision, the
attorney may be in the odd position of advocating a result which, per-
sonally, the lawyer believes is not in the child's best interests.21 Thus,
a lawyer should be prepared to make an argument that a client's de-
sire is in her best interests as long as the lawyer can do so in good
faith. The lawyer should press herself to make those arguments even
when they conflict with her personal assessment of the client's "best
interests."'
Thus, in a majority of the legal proceedings faced by the child advo-
cate in doing child protective work, best interests will be a lurking
concern for the court. Preparation for legal argument in the case must
therefore often be done with an eye towards framing the client's posi-
tion in terms of that looming legal standard.23
should certainly require the state to demonstrate imminent harm to the child and
prevent premature court deliberations on the issue of the child's best interests.
21. Of course, like any attorney, the child's attorney is bound not to make frivo-
lous claims. Model Rules, supra note 5, Rule 3.1. Thus, if there is no argument that a
child's desire is in the child's best interest, the lawyer should theoretically be unable
to make that argument. In practical application, however, the duty of zealous advo-
cacy requires that a lawyer define the term "frivolous claims" very narrowly. Only
claims which are clearly untenable under the controlling law, or which reflect a wish
of "harassing or maliciously injuring a person," should be deemed frivolous. Id. Rule
3.1 cmt. Such a narrow definition of frivolous claims prevents lawyers from arbitrarily
vetoing their client's wishes. Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1419 n.68.
22. As Representing Children will address in Part Two, The Lawyer-Child Client
Relationship, a lawyer who believes he is making a very marginal or "likely to fail"
claim, should certainly counsel her client about the tenuousness of the argument and
encourage the client to consider more constructive positions. Peters, Representing
Children, supra note 2. Nevertheless, if after thorough counseling, the client persists
in wanting a marginally possible objective, and the lawyer can make a good faith
claim for that, Rule 3.1 should not prevent her from putting forth that claim.
23. Bruce Boyer points out that the prevalence of the best interests standard im-
poses a similar obligation on parents' lawyers to translate their clients' objective into
terms of best interests of the child. Bruce Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation
of Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1621, 1626-27 (1996).
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B. Best Interests As the Ultimate Concern for Most Other
Professionals Involved with the Client
The lawyer must understand best interests additionally because best
interests frames the ethical purview of most of the other professionals
dealing with the client in the case. Although the lawyer who has -not
been assigned guardian ad litem does not necessarily have this duty,
certainly the child's therapist, state social worker, teacher, counselor,
and other professionals are charged with protecting their client's "best
interests." For instance, the social work code of ethics clearly places
the interests of clients before straight advocacy of a client's desires.24
The lawyer getting information from these professionals, cooperating
with them on various matters, meeting with them, and seeking settle-
ment with them would do well to remember this primary concern of
these professionals.
The lawyer should also be mindful that the straight advocacy role of
the lawyer will seem anomalous or repugnant to some of these profes-
sionals. Many professionals are horrified to think that a lawyer would
represent the stated wishes of a child. A child's lawyer's failure to
factor in this potential gulf between professional responsibilities can
sometimes make initial communication with other professionals ex-
tremely awkward. This tension is compounded because many non-
legal professionals understandably approach lawyers with a negative
bias due to popular negative opinions about lawyers.
Therefore, the child's attorney who stresses that he understands the
best interests mandate of the professionals with whom he is talking
may break down uncomfortable barriers to communication. It is often
useful to spell out the responsibilities of the various professionals to
make clear that everyone understands whose role is whose.25 The
child's lawyer must understand and speak the language of best inter-
ests to communicate usefully with other professionals. Often, a law-
yer well-versed in best interests terminology and theory may forge
settlement out of court with those crucial nonlegal professionals on
issues both central and ancillary to the case.
At critical points in building relationships with other professionals,
it is useful to ask them to explain to you their understanding of their
ethical duties and their understanding of the child's best interests. Be
aware that various other professionals almost certainly have conflict-
24. See, e.g., Code of Ethics of The National Association of Social Workers
§ 1.G.1 (1994) (advising a social worker acting on behalf of a client adjudged legally
incompetent to "safeguard the interests and rights of that client"); see also Code of
Ethics of The National Federation of Societies for Clinical Social Work § MI.e (1988)
(advising a clinical social worker acting on behalf of a client, "always [to] safeguard
the interests and concerns of that client").
25. The interdisciplinary meeting, which will be explained in Part Three of Repre-
senting Children, is often a useful forum for this clarification. See Peters, Representing
Children, supra note 2.
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ing theories within their profession about the definition of "best inter-
ests." For instance, the writings of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit seek
to replace a focus on best interests with a focus on permanent "least
detrimental" alternatives for the child.26 That permanency view in-
volves in turn an assumption that the child's long-term best interest is
usually served by preserving one long-term permanent caregiver for
the child. Nevertheless, another school of thought suggests that a per-
manent caregiver may be less important than the family network sur-
rounding the child.27 Therefore, the child's attorney must educate
herself about the factors contributing to a professional's view of best
interests as she enters an ongoing dialogue, to create a basis for possi-
ble agreement and collaboration.
Determining the ethical duties of other professionals need not be
cumbersome or overly artificial. Generally, as the attorney introduces
himself to other players in the case, his words and actions will clarify
his role in the case. It is very common, for instance, for nonlegal pro-
fessionals unfamiliar with family court to wonder and ask, "Say, how
did this kid get a lawyer in the first place?" The lawyer can briefly
explain what statute and custom led to his appointment. Usually con-
versations about role need only take place in the initial encounters.
The lawyer, however, should clarify his role at critical junctures in the
case. For instance, at a presettlement phase of a case, one may have
heated interactions with case workers or therapists whose views of
one's client differ from one's own. It is often useful in those highly
charged situations to step back and comment about the differences
among the lawyer's roles, to reiterate the lawyer's understanding and
respect for other ethical imperatives, and to search for ways to resolve
the issue at hand in a way that is consistent with all of those roles.28
Often professionals gather at various kinds of meetings before
court, whether it is a settlement meeting or an interdisciplinary team
meeting or a case conference of some kind.2 9 Meetings of this kind
sometimes descend quickly into confusion for the simple reason that
people do not know the identities and roles of everyone at the meet-
ing. Even when meetings begin by having everyone introduce himself,
late-comers or those who cannot write fast enough are often lost
about the identities of the different people at the meeting. Circulating
26. See infra notes 63-128 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing the
works of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit).
27. See infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Family Network
Model).
28. For a discussion of how to seek to resolve such conflicts among lawyers and
consulting social workers serving the same clients, see Jean Koh Peters, Concrete
Strategies for Managing Ethically-based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and
Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. KY. Children's Rts. J.
15 (1991).
29. These meetings and the dynamics thereof are discussed in more depth in Part
Three of Representing Children. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2.
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an attendance sheet listing name, organization, and phone number to
consult during the meeting is often useful. As Part Three of Repre-
senting Children discusses, a well-prepared lawyer should know in ad-
vance who will attend each meeting and what is each person's role.
3 1
The attorney may then anticipate how that person's view of the case,
usually couched in terms of best interests, will lead her to react to the
client's position in the case. Once those roles and positions are identi-
fied, the lawyer can begin to strategize about convincing those profes-
sionals to support the client's position and building consensus around
the client's position generally. Thus, even a lawyer utterly committed
to representing the stated wishes of his client must be able to couch
his client's position in terms of best interests in dealing effectively with
other professionals serving the same client.
C. Best Interests As a Guide to Conducting Your Relationship with
the Client: Making Micro Choices that Affect Your Client's
Well-Being
The logistics of the lawyer-child client relationship require the law-
yer for the child to make, on behalf of the client, many decisions that
are appropriately resolved by reference to the client's best interests.
For instance, the first interview with a client will often present a
number of logistical choices for the lawyer. Should the interview take
place at the lawyer's office, at the child's home or foster home, at the
child's school, at the foster care agency serving the child, or some
other place? How should that meeting be scheduled and who should
prepare the client for the meeting in the first instance? Should any-
one besides the lawyer and the client attend? It is appropriate and
necessary for the lawyer to make educated guesses about the client's
best interests in setting up that visit before the lawyer-client relation-
ship has even begun.3 1
Another classic "micro" decision that a lawyer might make would
involve the timing of breaking adverse news to a client such as news
about a negative evaluation of a mother with whom the child wished
to be reunited or even a negative psychiatric evaluation of the child
herself.32 Picking the time and place for those encounters with the
30. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2.
31. Indeed Part Two of Representing Children discusses ways to approach the first
interview to make the client as comfortable with the lawyer and the lawyer's role as
possible. Id.
32. Note that the comment to Model Rule 1.4 suggests that, in some circum-
stances, all lawyers may be justified in "delaying transmission of information when the
client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication." Model
Rules, supra note 5, Rule 1.4 cmt. The rule itself requires that "[a] lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information." Id. Rule 1.4(a). The comment offers as an ex-
ample that "a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the ex-
amining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client." Id- Rule 1.4 cmt.
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client must inevitably be done based on the lawyer's assessment of
how the client would be best prepared and supported in receiving that
information. Especially in planning a first meeting, the lawyer may
only have an educated guess at the child's best interests to guide her in
small decisions that may have a big impact on the lawyer-child client
relationship.
Even when the determination of best interests is based on very pre-
liminary information, the lawyer should think through these decisions
as carefully as possible. Whether large or small, these common deci-
sions may deeply affect the lawyer-child client relationship. An excel-
lent, comfortable first meeting may propel the relationship forward; a
painful awkward one may set the relationship back. While the lawyer
should not expect to control the tenor of a meeting completely, the
lawyer should attempt to make each meeting as comfortable as possi-
ble for her child client.33
D. Additional Roles for Best Interests Based Upon Child's Ability
to Be Counseled
In addition to those three roles that best interests plays in the repre-
sentation of all lawyers for children, best interests plays additional
roles depending on the client's ability to be counseled. Lawyers coun-
seling clients should confront their own conclusions about the child's
best interests and the client's decision making to keep the lawyer's
counseling as free from bias as possible. Lawyers representing clients
who cannot be counseled are called upon to do the biggest job of all:
to determine the objectives of the client representation.
1. For Clients Who Can be Counseled
a. Counseling The Client About The Lawyer's Conclusions About
The Client's Best Interests
If the client is someone who can communicate with the lawyer and
be counseled effectively, the ethical codes permit and encourage all
lawyers to counsel their clients about the lawyer's view of their "best
interests." For instance, Model Rule 2.1 advises that, "[i]n rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
Under no circumstances, however, may a lawyer "withhold information to serve the
lawyer's own interest or convenience." Id.
33. Keep in mind that "as comfortable as possible" may not in the end be very
comfortable. As Part Two of Representing Children explores, because many legal is-
sues pose deeply unpleasant issues for the client, a lawyer should understand that
children will often dread meetings with their lawyers. It is critical that lawyers not
distort their roles by attempting to overcompensate, through gifts, food, and fun activ-
ities, for the pain that their clients are undergoing. Peters, Representing Children,
supra note 2.
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such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be rele-
vant to the client's situation."'  As the Comment notes:
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a
client especially where practical considerations, such as cost or ef-
fects on other people, are predominant.... Although a lawyer is not
a moral adviser as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge
upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law
will be applied.3
The rules therefore clearly contemplate that lawyers will advise clients
about the broader effects that any legal decision might have upon
their lives and the lives of others.36 In that counseling capacity, the
lawyer thus properly discusses the lawyer's assessment of the client's
best interests and the impact of the client's decisions upon those best
interests.37
34. Model Rules, supra note 5, Rule 2.1.
35. Id. Rule 2.1 cmt.
36. A thoughtful debate about the appropriate role of lawyer recommendations in
client counseling generally can be found in the writings of Stephen Ellmann, Robert
Dinerstein, Peter Margulies, and others. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501, 570 (1990) (arguing
that Ellmann's presumption in favor of lawyer advice should be reversed in order to
counteract rampant lawyer paternalism); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 717, 746, 761, 767 (1987) (arguing that lawyers owe their clients the
full benefit of the lawyer's experience and that a lawyer's determination to protect
client autonomy by not giving advice actually stifles the client's freedom to decide for
herself whether she wants her lawyer's opinion); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care
as an Ethic For Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2707-12 (1993) (arguing that an applica-
tion of Carol Gilligan's concept of an ethic of care to legal practice would result in
lawyers being even more forthcoming with moral and ethical advice than Model Rule
2.1 initially suggests); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?". Attorney-
Client Deliberations Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.
L. Rev. 213, 214, 240 (1990) (arguing that the lawyer's obligations to her clients and to
society as a whole require the lawyer to give advice regarding the moral, psychologi-
cal and policy consequences of the client's decisions and in some circumstances to
withdraw from representation if the client ignores the lawyer's advice) [hereinafter
"Who Are You to Tell Me That?"].
These writers react to their reading of the perspectives on interviewing and counsel-
ling legal clients found in David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and
Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach (1977) and David A. Binder et al., Law-
yers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991). Binder and Price's 1977
book called on lawyers to encourage clients to make their own decisions, and-set out
only a few circumstances in which lawyers should offer advice or respond to requests
for advice. Binder & Price, supra, at 166, 196-203. Binder, Bergman, and Price, in
their 1990 book, took a more expansive view of lawyer advice while still placing their
focus on client autonomy. Binder et al., supra, at xxii, 279. While specific prescrip-
tions vary among the authors taking part in the debate, all agree that the lawyer must
be careful to preserve client autonomy while giving the client the benefit of useful
counseling.
37. Emily Buss addresses the importance of clearly communicating to a child cli-
ent about the nature of representation so that the child knows whether the attorney is
representing the child's wishes or the child's best interests. Buss, supra note 11, at
1720-21. Communication about the lawyer's role is an essential element of the law-
yer's obligations under Model Rule 1.14. Because little in a child's experience will
cause her to expect that an adult will listen to and advocate her views, it is essential
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In addition, the client will often solicit the lawyer's advice: "What
do you think I should do? Do you think I'm doing the right thing?"
We have come to assume that professionals of all kinds-doctors, ar-
chitects, technical support people-will be able to tell us what they
believe is the best choice in a given situation. Indeed, we would often
be appalled if a treating professional did not supplement her explana-
tion of available options with one or two preferences based on her
own experience and knowledge of us as patients.
b. Confronting One's View of Best Interests to Promote
Honest Counseling
Best interests also plays a role in the lawyer's representation of a
client as an inevitable part of honest lawyering. In preparing for a
counseling session with a client, for instance, a lawyer may be aware
that a client wishes to pursue a course of action that the lawyer finds
repugnant or does not believe is best for the client. Especially when
the client is a child, the lawyer will be tempted to impose her own
belief upon the client. It may be easier, for instance, for a lawyer to
seek to manipulate her client into accepting the lawyer's position in-
stead of disciplining herself to advocate zealously for the client's posi-
tion.38 Every lawyer must be aware of this temptation. Because
children are even more likely than adults to be cowed by a lawyer's
strong recommendation, the lawyer must approach a child client's
choice with particular restraint.39
Therefore, before counseling her client, a conscientious child's law-
yer should confront herself with her own views of the client's best
interests to remind herself to listen to the client's desires and not to
superimpose her own. Lawyers who confront their own views of what
is in their client's best interests and who expose these views free them-
that the child's lawyer c6mmunicate fully about the nature of the representation. Id.
at 1723-24. The Council of the Family Law Section of the ABA recognized this obli-
gation by including in its proposed standards the lawyer's duty to "remain aware of
the power dynamics inherent in adult-child relationships" when expressing the law-
yer's assessment of the case. Proposed ABA Standards, supra note 11, § B-4 cmt.
38. Stephen Ellmann, in discussing client-centered counseling, has pointed out the
danger that even a lawyer who has no desire to manipulate her client may still seek to
mold the client's thinking in service of what the lawyer sees as the client's interests, or
some broader social interest. Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, supra note 36, at 727.
Peter Margulies, while asserting that lawyers should counsel their clients about the
morality, psychological impact, and unintended consequences of their goals, distin-
guishes influencing clients from manipulating them. Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell
Me That?," supra note 36, at 247-49. Manipulation, according to Margulies, is usually
an attempt to achieve the lawyer's goals in the guise of the client's best interests. Id. at
249.
39. I agree with Martha Matthews that "[t]he child's lawyer has an ethical duty to
avoid using her superior skills and social position to silence the child's voice, or coerce
the child into passive compliance with the lawyer's views." Matthews, supra note 8, at
1458.
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selves up to hear what the client is really saying as opposed to what
the lawyer hopes the client is really saying.
41
2. For Clients Who Cannot Be Counseled: Determining the
Objectives of the Representation
For the client who cannot be counseled, e.g., the baby, the nonver-
bal child, or the child with a severe intellectual deficit, best interests
plays the biggest role of all: it is the ultimate goal of the representa-
tion. It is difficult to consider a greater task than to determine the
best interests of the client on both macro and micro issues, somewhat
independent of the client's input. This basically replicates the role of
the former guardian ad litem.
A central theme of this Article is that the lawyer should question
any role that requires her to make large best interests determinations
for her clients and then seek to achieve them as a goal of the represen-
tation. As discussed in part II below, little in the lawyer's training or
the lawyer's role in society qualifies her to do that job.4 ' The discus-
sion of the contents of best interests that follows explores how a law-
yer'should make best interests determinations of any kind. It must be
noted from the outset, however, that calling upon a lawyer to deter-
mine the goal of her own representation of a client, largely independ-
ent of that client's direct input and largely independent of the client's
wishes, is an anomalous and deeply complicated divergence from the
usual path of legal representation.42 Moreover, it is not even clear
40. The danger of hearing only what you want to hear from your client may be
particularly strong during initial interviews when you are trying to determine the facts
of your client's case. While it is inevitable and useful that the lawyer will have one or
more working hypotheses in mind at this stage, it is all too easy unconsciously to
structure an interview so that it elicits only facts which confirm the hypothesis without
ever getting to the truth of the case as the child sees it. See John Rich, Interviewing
Children and Adolescents 6-9 (1968) (citing Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of
the World 8 (1929), on the difficulty adult researchers have in not imposing their own
preconceived ideas upon children with whom they are working). Part Two of Repre-
senting Children will offer the child's attorney's techniques for confronting her subjec-
tive desires for the child so that her client counselling can focus on the client's, not the
lawyer's concerns. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2.
41. The fact that normal ethical analysis does not apply to a particular representa-
tion should be a clear warning sign that the lawyer is out of his professional depth.
Christopher Wu's discussion of conflicts of interest notes that a lawyer who gets to set
the goals of litigation may never be able to declare a conflict of interest. Christopher
N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representatioti of Children in Dependency Cases, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1857, 1861 (1996). Wu warns lawyers against taking any comfort in
this; on the contrary it should "be seen as a strong signal that the attorney is engaged
in some function other than the practice of law." Id. at 1860.
42. The conflicts created by this type of representation are analogous to those
facing the lawyer for a corporate entity. Under Model Rule 1.13, such a lawyer may
have an obligation to inform the entity's officers that the lawyer does not represent
them, but rather the best interests of the corporation. Model Rules, supra note 5,
Rule 1.13(d). Emily Buss, in her article for this Conference has applied this analysis
to the situation of a lawyer who decides to represent a child's best interests. Buss,
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that Model Rule 1.14 allows the lawyer to take on the full guardian ad
litem role. Rule 1.14(b) authorizes a lawyer to "seek appointment of a
guardian or take other protective action," but it is unclear if that pro-
tective action could include deciding the client's best interests and
pursuing them as a goal of the representation. At least one commen-
tator has suggested that "other protective action" is necessarily
smaller than determining the client's best interests and pursuing those
lawyer-defined interests.43
The lawyer entrusted with the job of representing a child's best in-
terests must determine those interests with extreme caution. Every
lawyer who claims to pursue the client's best interests must have a
principled understanding of what that best interests determination
looks like and how those principles are applied from case to case." It
may appear that, because I contemplate that lawyers will continue to
make best interest determinations on behalf of their clients, and be-
cause I believe that lawyers can continue, for some clients, to deter-mine the ultimate objectives of the representation, I am essentially
ratifying the continuation of lawyers acting as guardians ad litem for
their clients. This is not the case. I believe that it is useful and neces-
sary to abandon the guardian ad litem role for the following reason:
Lawyers playing the role of guardian ad litem often have felt uncon-
strained by traditional lawyering duties. They have acted as witnesses,
they have abrogated duties of confidentiality, they have disregarded
or downplayed their client's desires, and they do not always include
their client in decision making in the representation. In the extreme,
these lawyers have seen the role of guardian ad litem as permission to
pursue representation without meeting their clients, and with little or
no investigation.4 5 As noted in the Introduction, I believe that there
supra note 11, at 1735-36. Extending the analogy offered by Hazard & Hodes, supra
note 8, § 1.14:102, Buss notes that in an entity representation, communication is com-
plicated by the fact that the lawyer must seek information from the entity's human
officers while not misleading them about where the lawyer's duties of confidentiality
and advocacy lie. Buss, supra note 11, at 1735-37. When the entity is a child's best
interests, the situation is even more complicated, because children are more easily
mislead about the lawyer's role than are sophisticated adult corporate officers. Id.
43. Fall Ferguson, Applying Developmental Principles Within the Lawyer's Role:
A Central Dilemma for Lawyers for Children (May 1994) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). Ferguson distinguishes best interests representation from Rule
1.14(b) protective action by pointing out that nothing in Rule 1.14(b) or the Comment
mandates that protective action be permanent or comprehensive. Rather, she urges
that protective action should be designed to address specific incapacities at specific
moments of the representation. Id. at 28-29.
44. Part II, infra, describes four models of determining best interests and proposes
a model integrating the four approaches in child placement decisions.
45. Linda Long cites a conversation with a lawyer friend who said: "I'm so glad
that I'm a guardian ad litem in this case. For once I don't have to think and act like a
lawyer." Linda L. Long, When the Client Is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role,
21 J. Fain. L. 607, 621 n.44 (1982-83); see also Wu, supra note 41, at 1861 (discussing
the problems that occur when lawyers do not consult their clients when determining
the objectives of the representation).
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is a lawyerly way for a lawyer to represent a nonverbal child or other
children who cannot fully direct their representation. I believe that
lawyers representing children can abide by the Model Rules, including
the duties of confidentiality, the duties of knowing and respecting cli-
ent views, the duties of client direction, and the prohibition on lawyers
becoming witnesses. The process outlined at the end of part II is
designed to guide lawyers in confronting the dilemma of making best
interests decisions without full client input in a way that is client-cen-
tered and lawyerly.
E. Summary
To summarize, all children's lawyers, even the most client-directed
ones, inevitably must make some kinds of determinations about the
child client's best interests. They may be as tiny as deciding how an
interview should be structured or how a piece of information should
be delivered; they may be as large as deciding the entire goal of the
representation. Thus, it is critical that lawyers employ a principled
process in discerning the content of best interests. The next part will
review the various definitions of best interests and propose an inte-
grated model for use by contemporary child advocates.
I
II. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DETERMINING
BEST INTERESTS
To derive a principled, integrated definition of best interests to be
used by lawyers in the various moments in the representation ex-amined in part I, this part must first explore the definitions of best
interest that have been in use to date. This part identifies four such
models:
(1) The Total Lawyer Discretion Model;
(2) The Expert Deference Model;
(3) The Psychological Parent Model;
(4) The Family Network Model.
Model One relies upon the total discretion of the child's attorney.
Model Two defers the best interests decision to one of three kinds of
experts in the case: one already involved with the child or family, one
appointed by the court, or one retained by the attorney. Model Three
relies upon principles enunciated by an eminent trio of scholars who
have focused upon continuity of care, the perspective of the child, and
the psychological parent as crucial principles guiding all determina-
tions of "best interests." Model Four proposes instead a child welfare
analysis focusing on preserving the child's family network. Each
model is discussed briefly before deriving an integrated model for use
by attorneys for children today.
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A. Four Existing Models for Determining Best Interests
1. The Total Lawyer Discretion Model: The Guardian ad litem
Recent empirical research suggests that a majority of lawyers
throughout the country are left to their total discretion in determining
best interests.46 This section defines and critiques this approach and
discusses why, despite its patent flaws, the approach continues to
flourish.
a. Definition: Whatever the Lawyer Thinks Is Best
In its rawest form, this "definition" of best interests has no substan-
tive content at all. Best interests is left to the complete discretion of
the lawyer in the case. This lawyer, assigned to represent a child, ar-
rives at a decision about the best interests of a client through whatever
process the lawyer sees fit to use, based upon no set substantive guide-
lines. The lawyer is constrained by no procedural mandates nor any
substantive principles that are consistent from case to case. Thus, pro-
cedurally, a lawyer could determine the goals of his representation
based wholly, for instance, upon his reading of the neglect petition, or
upon a single conversation with the state child welfare caseworker, or
upon an exhaustive investigation of the matter at hand, or upon some-
thing in between. Substantively, no matter what procedure the attor-
ney uses, a lawyer ultimately takes whatever information he is using
and, applying his own gut instinct and "common sense," reaches an
opinion about a child's best interests, and advocates for that opinion.
b. Critique of the Total Discretion Model
The total discretion model suffers from three related but distinct
flaws. The model gives a lawyer a job for which he is neither trained
nor qualified, prevents the lawyer from doing the job that he is quali-
fied to do, and creates an unjust system where similar clients are not
represented similarly.
First, "the total discretion guardian ad litem" model gives the law-
yer the responsibility for an important job for which he is neither
trained nor qualified. Nothing in the traditional legal education quali-
46. For instance, a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and completed in 1993 concluded that a majority of the states direct
lawyers for children and guardians ad litem to "represent the best interests of the
child," with "no further guidance." The study concluded that, "for these States, the
decision of how to represent the child's interests or "best" interests appears to be left
to the discretion of the GAL or, perhaps, the courts." U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Administration on
Children, Youth and Families, National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Wash-
ington, D.C., Final Report on the Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Repre-
sentation through Guardian Ad Litem (1993). Copies of this Report can be obtained
from the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, P.O. Box
1182, Washington, D.C. 20013-1182 or by calling 1-800-FYI-3366.
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fies a lawyer to make determinations of a client's best interests. Law
school curricula often do not include guidance about human welfare,
child development, child welfare, family dynamics, or even philosophy
that might inform an educated guess about the best interests of an-
other. It is unclear what qualifies the average lawyer, as opposed to
the average social worker or a person close to a particular child, to
make a judgment about a child's interests which will then receive spe-
cial attention from the judge.
Having lawyers who are supposed to do what is "best for them"
must mystify and infuriate many child clients, just as it would many
adult clients. The child confronted with state workers in her home
and a lawyer claiming to want what is best for her will understandably
wonder what gives the lawyer the right to pry into her life. When the
lawyer advises his client about his view of the client's best interests,
the client might legitimately wonder, "Why should this lawyer's opin-
ion about my life be important to me?" The lawyer, especially one
court-appointed for a child, may appear to be one in a parade of
adults invading the family.
Lawyers are not qualified to represent clients in this way, because,
in many ways, the model turns the lawyer-client relationship on its
head. This extreme form of best interests representation omits several
of the most fundamental characteristics of lawyering. The lawyer-cli-
ent partnership and dialogue is reduced to a one-person monologue
wholly unchecked by the client. The client becomes an object, rather
than the subject, of the representation. The lawyer, usually agent, acts
as the principal in the relationship.
I believe that this level of discretion makes it inevitable that the
lawyer will sometimes resort to personal value choices, including ref-
erences to his own childhood, stereotypical views of clients whose
backgrounds differ from his, and his own lay understanding of child
development and children's needs, in assessing a client's best interests.
Especially for practitioners who must take cases in high volume, the
temptation to rely on gut instinct, stereotype, or even bias is over-
whelming. This jeopardizes the child client even more, as her unique
circumstances are quickly distorted by a stranger through his own lens
of experience and preconception.
Second, this model further frustrates child clients because it pre-
vents lawyers from doing what they are trained to do. The model pre-
vents lawyers from offering clients the chance to have their
perspectives aired before the court. The total discretion model de-
prives child clients of the chance to direct the representation, to in-
struct the lawyer to pursue certain goals, and to think through and
understand her options thoroughly and with counseling. This model,
in extreme cases, may deprive a client of even the knowledge that a
lawyer or court proceedings exists. Seen from the client's view, the
child does not receive two of the traditional benefits of professional
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service: adherence to a consistent code specifying ethical standards of
practice and in-depth professional training.47 Instead, the client be-
comes suddenly subject to the relationship. The lawyer, far from be-
ing constrained to communicate with, counsel, and present the client's
cause to the-tribunal, is not constrained to know the client at all.
Third, the total discretion model has led to a system containing un-
acceptable variability in child client representation. Seen in this ex-
treme form, the "whatever the lawyer thinks is best" view of
lawyering creates a huge area of unpredictability and inconsistency for
child clients. Because this view guarantees no consistency among
practitioners, the course of a child's case may be changed forever be-
cause practitioner A, who believed X was in the child client's best
interests, was appointed to the case, instead of practitioner B, who
believed Y was in the child client's best interests.48 Indeed, this view
does not even guarantee that the same lawyer will be consistent with
himself from case to case, because no practical or substantive guide-
lines make the lawyer's approach to his different cases uniform. 4 9
Thus, the total lawyer discretion model disserves both the client and a
legal system that seek quality representation, predictability, and
consistency.
c. Why the Model Persists and Even Prevails
Despite the patent unacceptability of the total discretion model,
many attorneys in many jurisdictions practice along these lines. Why
should such a manifestly unlawyerly model persist?
Ironically, the model gratifies a number of powerful constituencies,
while frustrating those least empowered to change it. For instance,
many practitioners enjoy the discretion the model affords them be-
cause, by definition, they are always doing what they believe to be best.
A practitioner is bound to feel good about her work when she believes
that her efforts are always being used for her client's good. Likewise,
some judges may find that having a lawyer in the case whose job re-
sembles the judge's job simplifies the difficult task of judging. Espe-
cially where the judge thinks highly of the child lawyer's values,
finding them similar to his own, judges can take comfort and conven-
47. Christopher Wu notes that children subject to child protective proceedings are
already surrounded by people who must determine and achieve the child's best inter-
ests. What the child's lawyer should bring to the table is not a duplication of this
function, but the loyalty and advocacy that are the essence of the lawyer's profes-
sional identity. Wu, supra note 41, at 1871-72.
48. See Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1415 ("Similar cases will be decided differ-
ently merely because of chance assignment of a lawyer.")
49. Examining judicial decision making, Robert-Mnookin points out that the best
interest standard, being essentially indeterminate, poses an "obviously greater risk of
violating the fundamental precept that like cases should be decided alike." Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indetermi-
nacy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 263.
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ience in relying upon the child's lawyer's judgments in the case.5 °
Similarly, legislatures seeking to improve the quality of deliberations
in child protective cases may find it easier to appoint lawyers, gener-
ally at very low rates of pay, in these cases, rather than authorizing
money for courts to retain experts in child welfare to assist them.
Scarcity of resources also hampers the development of more sophis-
ticated models of child representation. Private practitioners paid a
low hourly fee or high-volume legal aid practices may be hard-pressed
to spend more time per client on their cases. Currently, expert input
and testimony to aid both practitioner and court is generally far be-
yond the means of most lawyers and court systems. Other profession-
als, who repeatedly are frustrated by this model of representation, for
instance, workers and clinicians at agencies working with children,
may decide that, of the many battles for better resources for their cli-
ents in the community, the battle for better legal representation is not
the highest priority. Other players exposed to this model tend to be
involved with the system only for one child or a few children, e.g., a
concerned relative, an involved teacher, or the parents and children
themselves, and are hardly in a position to effect legal change. Chil-
dren, as a constituency, have no power to lobby for better lawyers.
Additionally, the historical version of the total discretion model, the
guardian ad litem model, appears to have served an important purpose
in its day. When proceedings concerning child welfare were popu-
lated only by judges, lawyers for the state, and lawyers for the parents,
a vocal figure focusing concern about the child's perspective probably
provided an important balance to courtroom discussions. The pres-
ence of the guardian ad litem may have prevented those proceedings
from dissolving into a simplistic two-sided custody battle between par-
ent and state. Now that guardians ad litem or lawyers for children of
some kind must, by statute, appear in all these proceedings, however, I
believe that it is time for children's lawyer's role to be definitively
clarified. Child clients require both much more and much less of law-
yers than the total discretion model has asked. The remaining models,
and the integrated model which concludes this part, attempt to pro-
vide a more principled method of determining a child client's best
interests.
2. The Expert Deference Model
Some attorneys, recognizing their lack of qualifications in assessing
their client's interests, have concluded that they must defer to experts
in determining their client's best interests. These experts are usually
one of three sorts: (1) a professional already involved with the child;
50. "In the real world, judges rely on the advocacy of a child's lawyer." Guggen-
heim, supra note 12, at 1430 n.102 (referencing Patricia S. Curley and Gregg Herman,
Representing the Best Interests of Children: The Wisconsin Experience, J. Am. Acad.
Matrimonial Law. 9 (1995)).
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(2) an expert consultant (who may also be an expert witness) retained
by the attorney; or (3) an independent expert appointed by the court.
After describing each kind of expert, I will discuss briefly my hypothe-
sis that court-appointed experts currently enjoy the most deference
from courts, when in fact experts who have been or will be involved
with the family long term should be given special deference over one-
time evaluators of the case.
a. A Professional Already Involved with the Child
A substantial number of our clients are already involved with pro-
fessionals when they come to our attention. For instance, any child
enrolled in school has a school guidance counselor and teacher; some
others may be in community counseling or therapy. Most of them
(but always fewer than one would hope) have doctors or clinics who
see them regularly. These and other professionals have become in-
volved with the client separately from the court case and have goals.
for the professional relationship which are distinct from, but often af-
fected by, the legal proceeding. They may, in some cases, have long-
term relationships with our clients and their families. These relation-
ships may not only have pre-existed the family's court involvement,
but also last well after the lawyers and the courts have finished their
work.
Ordinarily, the child's attorney would identify and, optimally, meet
most of these professionals in the early fact-finding stage of the case.51
Early on, a child's attorneys should seek to identify professionals who
are especially important to the client, either because of extensive day-
to-day contacts or because a particular individual has established an
especially strong interpersonal relationship with the client. These
strong relationships may be positive or negative, but if they are impor-
tant to the child, for whatever reason, then they will likely be very
important to the lawyer as she gets to know the client.
These professionals may have goals for the client and their profes-
sional relationship with the mutual client that are not fully consistent
with the demands of the proceeding that brought the child a lawyer.52
51. This is one of the initial steps recommended by the Council of the Family Law
Section of the ABA in Standard C-2(6) of their proposed Standards of Practice. Pro-
posed ABA Standards, supra note 11, § C-2 cmt.
52. Of course, in some cases, these professionals may have participated in the
bringing of the child protective action by reporting the family to the state department
of child welfare. As one can imagine, these professionals are often experiencing a
dramatic crisis in their relationships with the client and his family at the precise mo-
ment at which the lawyer is entering the case. In these circumstances, caution in asso-
ciating oneself too closely with these professionals when initially meeting the client is
essential. This need not prevent the lawyer from talking to these professionals (as one
would interview anyone who initially reported the family to the state), but does sug-
gest that the attorney keep some distance from them in early encounters with the
family until the attorney determines the client's connection and level of trust with
these professionals.
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Many of these professionals have confidential relationships with the
clients that they share with us, and therefore they need to be ex-
tremely careful in not breaching that confidentiality in encounters
with the lawyer and the court. Although some lawyers and judges
believe that those confidentiality provisions fall away in light of the
gravity of the legal claims which give rise to child protective proceed-
ings,53 it is critical to note that the child has often come to rely upon
the safety of the confidential relationship.54 Lawyers should be care-
ful to get releases from their clients before extensive conversations55
with other professionals, to be careful not to endanger these pre-ex-
isting professional relationships.
As hard as it may be to admit, most of the time these professionals
will be more important to the client and his welfare than is the lawyer.
While lawyers can intervene at critical moments in their clients' lives,
solve nagging problems and, one hopes, otherwise contribute to bet-
tering the quality of clients' lives, these professionals are often an im-
53. For a discussion of the complex interaction among the lawyer's obligation of
confidentiality and the obligations prescribed by the ethical codes of social workers,
psychiatrists, and other professionals, see Gerard F. Glynn, Multidisciplinary Repre-
sentation of Children: Conflicts Over Disclosures of Client Communications, 27 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 617 (1994). Glynn notes that mandatory child abuse reporting laws
have been interpreted to supersede the treating professional's obligations of confiden-
"tiality to the client. Id. at 639-43. I recognize that the caution I recommend may
create a dilemma for lawyers who practice in jurisdictions where the privileges are
abrogated in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1046(a)(vii) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1996) (limiting the state's statutory physician-patient, psychiatrist-client,
social worker-client, and rape counselor-client privilege in child protective
proceedings).
54. Peter Margulies cautions children's lawyers to respect the "quasi-property" in-
terest that a child may have in information entrusted to a treating professional. Mar-
guies, supra note 10, at 1494.
55. This will sometimes put the lawyer in a veritable Catch-22. For instance, in
one case, a client's therapist protested to me that I should have discussed the case
with him before I met with my client. According to my duties to my client, however, I
felt that I needed a release from her (and a sense about how she felt about the thera-
pist) before I spoke to the therapist.
One solution, where a client has a long-term therapeutic relationship, is for the
lawyer to have a "preliminary," non-substantive conversation with a client's therapist,
informing the therapist simply that the lawyer has been appointed and that the lawyer
will be making an appointment to see the child client in the near future. This solution
would allow the therapist to talk to his client about the court case and the imminent
appearance of the lawyer and thereby prepare the client for the first meeting with the
lawyer. This may not be a foolproof solution, however; if the lawyer later ascertains
that the client dislikes the therapist, the lawyer may wish that she had contacted the
client completely separately from the therapist. Still, if this therapist is a long-term
player in the child's life, the lawyer's initial actions should acknowledge the therapist
as an important and ongoing resource for the child.
Like many "micro" choices that lawyers need to make in setting up meetings with
their clients, this decision must be made based upon the lawyer's best judgment based
upon the (probably sketchy) information available to him at the time. I would tend to
give heavy weight to the length of the therapeutic relationship, the client's degree of
mental illness or emotional disability, and the recommendations of others who know
the client as to whether or not to contact the therapist before meeting the client.
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portant ongoing part of the clients' lives. Therefore, lawyers must
treat these pre-existing, and often post-existing, relationships with the
utmost respect. Even after lawyers are gone, these social workers,
doctors, teachers, counselors, therapists, lay advocates, and other pro-
fessionals will continue to work closely with the clients, day in and day
out. It is important that the short-term lawyer-client relationship not
disrupt these important services for the lawyer's clients.
For the same reason, involving these professionals as experts in the
quest to determine the client's best interests is often complicated, be-
cause these professionals already have established procedures and
goals with the client which may conflict with or supersede the lawyer's
procedures and goals. First, if a professional is currently treating the
client, writing a report to a court or attorney about the client's best
interests could easily run afoul of the confidentiality which the profes-
sional promised to the client. Second, even if the confidentiality
problems are resolved, through waiver, for instance, the professional
may still conclude that stating an opinion and laying forth the evi-
dence for that opinion at this juncture in the professional-child client
relationship would compromise the relationship. For instance, a pro-
fessional who has premised his relationship with his child client on
nonjudgmental listening may find that foundation disrupted when
forced to take a position on the client's best interests in front of a
lawyer or judge. Similarly, testifying in court on a delicate matter like
a child's removal from the home may forever taint the professional's
relationship with the family. Third, the professional may loom so
large in the client's life already that his importance to the child tran-
scends the professional's role, like a teacher who assumes a big-broth-
erly relationship with the child after hours or the highly respected
family doctor who attends the same church as the family. Requiring
that professional to aid the court could put the court's needs before
the child's long-term need for the friendship and solidarity of this im-
portant figure.
Fourth, because these professionals are already enmeshed in the cli-
ent's life, they may not always have unbiased information to offer.
They may be unable to shake outmoded views of the family, or they
may be overly invested in their own theories of the family's well-be-
ing. They also may have other institutional concerns, related to the
agencies they serve. While the best professionals over a long period
of time may develop strong, constructive, trusting relationships with
clients, other less skilled or less caring practitioners may develop bi-
ases, misconceptions, and investments which disserve both the client
and the lawyer's representation.,
Therefore, the child's attorney must recognize a central conundrum
in seeking advice and early factual investigatory information from
these professionals. On the one hand, these professionals represent
an extraordinary font of useful information about the client and his
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family. On the other hand, the same history of involvement that
makes these professionals so potentially helpful to the lawyer, or to
the court, makes working with a strange lawyer or a powerful judge a
complicated and threatening new role for the professional. In addi-
tion, should the lawyer later discover that the client does not trust a
certain professional, the attorney will likely regret closely associating
with that professional at the outset of the attorney's relationship with
the child and may suffer in her own relationship with her client as a
result.
In seeking information from these professionals, then, children's at-
torneys must: (a) value and respect the ascendant importance of that
professional's long-term relationship with the attorney's client; (b) act
in ways that do not jeopardize or compromise that relationship by be-
ing sensitive to issues of confidentiality and other long-term dynamics
of those preexisting relationships; and (c) consult the professional
about the client's best interests only (i) when doing so would yield
helpful information while preserving the ongoing professional rela-
tionship, or (ii) as a last resort.
In the end, these professionals ought to be given special considera-
tion by lawyers and judges in child protective proceedings. Inasmuch
as they have no institutional loyalty to the lawyer or court (as the next
two kinds of experts do), they represent an extraordinarily rich poten-
tial source of wisdom for the case. These experts have a more ongoing
relationship with the client than they have with the lawyer or the court,
and thus are not hamstrung by the perspectives and demands of the
court proceeding. For these reasons also, however, relying on pre-
existing professional relationships to determine a client's best interests
can be tricky. Because of the delicate considerations involved in using
a professional already involved in a client's life to help one determine
a client's best interests, it is best not to rely on those judgments
exclusively.
b. An Expert Consultant (Who May Also Be an Expert Witness)
Working with the Attorney
In an increasing number of cases, lawyers representing children
work side-by-side with social workers and other professional consul-
tants hired to aid the lawyer in her representation. At the Legal Aid
Society-Juvenile Rights Division in New York City, for instance, a Ju-
venile Services Unit of staff social workers work in the same offices as
the staff attorneys. At some law school clinics, law student interns and
social work interns work together, supervised by attorneys and social
workers, to represent child clients.5 6 Private attorneys for children
also may retain social work or other professional assistance on a case-
56. This was the model of representation used, for instance, by the Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law Child Advocacy Clinic.
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by-case basis, paying the consultants either an hourly rate or a yearly
set rate for all cases.
Just as the professionals already working with the clients when the
lawyer meets them have ongoing relationships with the clients, these
expert consultants have ongoing relationships with the children's law-
yers. This difference subtly, but significantly, changes the expert's per-
spective on the client's case: by contrast with the treating
professionals, these retained consultants are, like the lawyers, short-
term intervenors into the family's life who, once the case is resolved,
will continue to have a relationship with the child's attorney, but not
necessarily with the child.
Professionals working with attorneys can provide a useful, and
often, crucial array of services to the client. First, where a client's spe-
cific needs require all professionals working with her to have special
knowledge or sensibilities, for instance, with a deaf client or a client
with mental illness, specialized professionals can help train lawyers in
necessary skills and perspectives. Like any lawyer undertaking a rep-
resentation which involves specialized expert knowledge, for instance
a products liability attorney facing intricate technological questions,
the child's attorney ought to have these kinds of expert advice as well.
Although written materials introducing the attorney to issues of child
development, childhood mental illness, or mental retardation and the
like do exist, only a consultant can help the attorney apply this exper-
tise in the particular context of a new client.
In these cases, nonlegal professionals can offer practical, concrete
help. They may help lawyers prepare for complicated interviewing.
In some cases, perhaps the professional would accompany the attor-
ney to an initial client meeting, to help the attorney develop a working
relationship with the client.58 Professionals with strong community
57. In some states, these retained experts may be paid by the court. See, e.g., N.Y.
County Law § 722-c (McKinney 1991) (allowing court to authorize counsel to obtain
expert services at the court's expense). In other cases, where legal aid organizations,
public defenders, or even groups of private practitioners contract for a group of cases
yearly at a negotiated fee, the payment for social work and other professional services
may be included in the total fee.
Despite these opportunities, it is painfully clear that the vast majority of lawyers
representing children do not have ample access to professional services that would
help them represent their clients more thoughtfully. As with the extraordinary low
rate of compensation generally paid to lawyers for children, this systemic problem
contributes to extraordinary stress and high caseloads for children's lawyers and must
be changed. Because the rest of this section details how useful these experts are to
sophisticated representation of children, it is hoped that these arguments can be mar-
shalled to convince state legislatures to allocate money for this important need.
58. Part II of Representing Children will provide more on this initial phase of the
attorney-client relationship. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2. Whenever
possible, it is much preferable for the attorney, rather than the consultant, to have the
primary relationship with the client, for both financial and ethical reasons. In a rare
case, where special expertise is critical to maintaining the lawyer-client relationship, a
lawyer may decide that the consultant alone has direct contact with the client.
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contacts may suggest helpful resources for the family, which may be
especially crucial in shoring up the family to avert the need for foster
placement of the attorney's client. Professionals may also participate
in interdisciplinary negotiations, being more able than the lawyer to
understand and respond to the nonlegal professionals working with
the child.
Finally, nonlegal professionals may be crucial to the lawyer faced
with the daunting task of determining the client's best interests. Some
lawyers delegate this function to their consultants, reasoning that
these professionals, unlike lawyers, have been trained to make princi-
pled determinations of best interests in family contexts. Lawyers may
also decide that consultant experts are critical when the issue of best
interests is in active litigation, because the consultant can put on the
child's case through her expert testimony.
Leaving the best interests determination to a retained expert, how-
ever, is an extremely expensive option, available currently to only a
tiny fraction of the lawyering for children community. Even when
these expert services are more widely available, it is unclear how
much of the tasks of lawyering should ultimately be delegated to non-
lawyer consultants, creating, as it does, an inevitable distance between
lawyer and client. While all lawyers for children should attempt to
make these services available to their clients, and should sensitize
themselves to the specific circumstances that suggest that those serv-
ices must be deployed for a particular client,59 lawyers should not as-
sume that all determinations of best interests can ultimately be
delegated to others. Lawyers continue to need to develop principled
ways of determining best interests for themselves in circumstances
where these experts are not available to them.
c. An Independent Expert Appointed by the Court
Courts in child protective proceedings often appoint experts to in-
vestigate specific questions and provide guidance to the court on ulti-
mate legal issues such as "best interests of the child." These
provisions make eminent good sense, because judges are regularly en-
trusted with determining a child's best interests and may not com-
pletely trust the parties to Present thoroughly the facts needed to
make such a determination. Generally, experts are not appointed
on all cases, or even most cases. When they are, they tend to be ex-
perts with ongoing relationships with the court; once a case is over,
these experts will probably never see the child or family, and perhaps
59. When and how to work with a nonlawyer consultant on the same case will be
discussed further in Chapter Seven of Representing Children. Id.
60. Indeed, if more states come to accept lawyers for children as advocates for
their expressed wishes after counseling rather than guardians ad litem with the same
duty to determine best interests as the court has, judges may come to rely upon these
experts even more.
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not even the attorneys again, but will most likely have an interest in
being appointed to evaluate cases for the court in the future.
Court-ordered evaluations can involve a tremendous amount of
time, investigation, and preparation time. Evaluators must review all
relevant records, interview all relevant parties and service providers,
prepare written reports detailing their findings, and testify in court on
these findings. Each of these steps may be very time-consuming: for
instance, rounding up all the records through the appropriate releases
may take weeks or months; interviewees may have schedules that
make appointments hard to schedule, and then may miss some, ex-
tending the interviewing period. Writing thoughtful, comprehensive
evaluations takes hard work and much time, as does preparing for
heavily cross-examined testimony,
Unfortunately, rates of payment for these court-appointed experts
remain relatively low. Until the rate of compensation is raised to
compensate fully the amount of time a capable evaluation would take,
many court-appointed experts will be forced to seek high volumes of
evaluations in order to be able to devote a substantial amount of their
practice (and to be able to make a living) doing this difficult work.
Attorneys for children may provide input into the choice of court-
appointed experts in some instances. If the attorney knows of any
specific concerns that children have with new adults (e.g., a little girl
who is very shy with older men, a Spanish-speaking child who relates
much better in Spanish than in English), those should certainly be
made known to the court. If the child has given the attorney a clear
wish as to the issues the expert is to evaluate, the lawyer should act in
every strategic way to make sure that the expert chosen is one likely
to recommend the child's desired result.61 Often, the local courthouse
or judge may have an established slate of experts whose reputations
and predilections can be investigated through word-of-mouth; while
being attentive to the vagaries of rumor and sour grapes, the child's
attorney should investigate those experts thoroughly. For the reasons
detailed above, the child's attorney should think carefully before al-
lowing a professional already involved with the family to be appointed
an expert by the court.
Commentators such as Albert J. Solnit eloquently warn against the
intrusive and possible harmful effect of the evaluations on the child
and family.6' A lawyer must acknowledge the possible ill-effects on
the family and on the child of another evaluation by a stranger. Inter-
views with the court-appointed expert, the time spent waiting for
61. Similarly, a child's attorney may be required to lobby against the appointment
of an expert, if the attorney has reason to believe that no expert will recommend the
client's objective in the case.
62. Remarks of Albert J. Solnit at class session of the Advocacy for Parents and
Children Clinical Seminar at the Yale Law School (March 20, 1995) (on fie with the
author).
1996] 1535
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
these evaluations to be completed, and the diversion of resources by
other professionals in the case spent in speaking with and providing
records to the expert may all take their toll. In determining whether
to support an appointment and how to structure an evaluation's logis-
tics, the child's lawyer must carefully factor in all these considerations.
As becomes clear when thinking through the logistics of court-ap-
pointed experts, the child's attorney cannot rely upon these experts to
advise her about the client's best interests, largely because of the tim-
ing of the expert's involvement. Because courts generally appoint
these experts later in the case, where settlement has been explored
and abandoned, and trial is inevitable, the child's attorney should
have developed a view of best interests long before the court expert is
identified. By the time the expert is appointed, the child's attorney
should be proactively trying to assure that any expert appointed will
vindicate the child's view of the case. Thus the attorney cannot wait
to formulate a view of best interests until such time as a court-ap-
pointed expert may advise him. The client's and lawyer's view of best
interests may change as a result of the evaluation, but until that time,
the lawyer must continue to pursue the client's initial instructions and
objectives. To the extent that the lawyer must determine and factor in
his client's "best interests," he must do so for much of the investiga-
tion without the benefit of the court-appointed expert's thoughts.
d. Summary
While various kinds of nonlawyer experts can aid the lawyer and
the court in determining best interests, lawyers for children cannot
rely upon these experts exclusively. Professionals already involved
with the clients when the attorney is appointed have established in-
vestments and goals for the professional-client relationship which may
well preclude the attorney from obtaining best interests information in
a reliable way. Some attorneys can retain experts, but those collabo-
rations are currently rare, given their expense, and even when avail-
able may unduly distance the lawyer from her child client. Court-.
appointed experts may prove indispensable in some cases, but are
rarely appointed in time to aid the lawyer in his best interests determi-
nations. Because each of these professionals also has other institu-
tional commitments (the first to his agency or employer, the second to
the child's attorney, and the third to the court), they are not perfect
advisors as to any given child's best interests.
Ironically, courts may currently give disproportionately heavy
weight to the opinions of court-appointed experts who, in most ways,
are the least knowledgeable of the, three kinds of experts. Profession-
als already serving the client and consultants working with the child's
attorney may actually have known the child longer and explored more
fulls' the background material on the family. Because the first two
kinds of experts are prevented in many cases from telling "all they
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know" to the judge, however, the court-appointed expert, who exists
in the case to serve the judge, will often seem to the court to be the
most reliable source. Strangely, professionals who have worked with
the family for years are virtually invisible to the court while these
evaluators, who may meet the child only once or twice, take center
stage. Lawyers for children should keep in mind this understandable
distortion of reality as seen from the bench in preparing their
presentations to the court.
3. The Psychological Parent Model
As described briefly above,6 3 the interdisciplinary Best Interests of
the Child trilogy has profoundly affected judging and lawyering
63. In Chapter One of Representing Children, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit are
discussed as follows:
Also influential nationally was a trilogy of books written by the distinguished
interdisciplinary collaboration of Joseph Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit, and
Anna Freud. Goldstein is a Yale Law Professor and a graduate in Career
Research from the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis.
Freud, who died in 1982, was the Director of the Hampstead Child-Therapy
Clinic and the prolific author of works on psychoanalysis and child develop-
ment. Solnit, a child psychiatrist, wrote the books when he was the Director
of the Yale Child Study Center and a Yale Medical School professor of Pedi-
atrics and Psychiatry. Sonja Goldstein, who formally joined the collabora-
tion in the third book, is a lawyer and lecturer at the Yale Child Study
Center and Law School
The first book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, published in 1973,
laid out guidelines for child placement laws, premised upon the child devel-
opmental principles of continuity, a child's sense of time, and the limits of
law and prediction. The book recommended that judges apply the "best in-
terests of the child" standard placing the child permanently with his psycho-
logical parent. The second book, Before the Best Interests of the Child,
published in 1979, focused on grounds for state intervention into families in
the first instance, laying out concrete standards which are designed to limit
state intervention to a minimum. In In the Best Interests of the Child, pub-
lished in 1986, the trio, joined by Sonja Goldstein, focus on the roles of pro-
fessionals in the child placement process, arguing that professionals should
generally stay within the boundaries of their own professional competence,
crossing those boundaries only in rare, carefully thought through
circumstances.
The influence of these books was immediate and profound. "[E]very sub-
sequent proposal for reform of the child welfare system has drawn its vocab-
ulary and central ideas from Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's conceptual
framework." Nadine Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit's Proposals: An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 485, 485 (1983-84). By 1983, one commentator, Brooklyn law pro-
fessor Marsha Garrison, reported that the trio's "central conclusions about
the needs of children in long-term foster care have gained remarkably wide-
spread acceptance." Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 423,449 (1982-83) (footnote omitted). Garrison noted that the
trio's premises "strongly influenced recent state foster care legislation and
several model acts dealing with termination of parental rights for children in
long term foster care," id. at 449-50 (footnotes omitted), as well as social
work handbooks and works of national planning commissions. Walking
through the halls of juvenile and family courts around the country, one can
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around the country. Armed with the principles laid out by Goldstein,
Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein, some attorneys for children may believe
that they are now equipped to determine a client's best interests based
upon that interdisciplinary teaching. After describing the trilogy's
central teachings in more depth, this section examines why such a use
of their principles would violate the authors' own prescriptions for
their work. This section also briefly examines critical views of the tril-
ogy, which suggest that the trilogy's principles do not fully protect all
children's best interests.
a. The Least Detrimental Alternative: Placement of The Child With
His Psychological Parent
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit propose replacing the "best interests of
the child" standard with a guideline requiring "the least detrimental
available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and develop-
ment."'  The authors stress that the best interests terminology leads
hear terms coined or popularized by the authors, especially psychological
parenting, permanency planning, continuity, and the child's sense of time,
bandied about during routine bargaining on individual cases.
At a symposium convened at Rutgers Law School in 1983 to assess the
impact of the trio's first two books, one commentator wrote that "the au-
thors have had an impact on the law governing child welfare decisions that
would exceed any academician's wildest expectations." Taub, supra, at 485.
Another authoi, surveying judicial and academic reactions to the first book
in 1979, wrote that Beyond the Best Interests of the Child "became what any
author would most fervently desire his or her book to become: that which
everyone must mention or risk being seen as an ignorant provincial." Rich-
ard E. Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child, 13 Farn. L.Q. 49, 50 (1979). In 1987, the
Harvard Law Review published an analysis by New York University law pro-
fessor and former New York Family Court Judge Peggy C. Davis of 193 judi-
cial opinions published between 1963 and 1984 that cited either the works of
the trio or the 1963 unsigned Yale Law Journal Note, Alternatives to 'Paren-
tal Right' in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151
(1963), which previewed some of their ideas. Peggy C. Davis, "There is a
Book Out... ". An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987).
As Chapter Six, II.C.2 explains in more depth, critics have lodged cogent,
trenchant complaints about the trio's work. In addition, it appears that their
ideas have been widely misunderstood or caricatured, inasmuch as some ad-
vocates cling to their insistence on minimum state intervention and label
them as "pro-biological family" while others focus on their -valuing of the
psychological parent as "anti-biological family." As a historical phenome-
non, however, the extraordinary reception and "absorption" of the trio's
ideas, both as they were expounded and as they have been erroneously inter-
preted, cannot be questioned. Their work signalled a shift towards a child-
centered view of the placement process, a concern about hasty state inter-
vention in the first instance, and a concern about lengthy, unresolved stays in
foster care. Their books have changed the discourse of child welfare
dramatically.
Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2.
64. Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 53 (1973) [here-
inafter Beyond].
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decision makers to forget that the child "is already a victim of his envi-
ronmental circumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy
action is necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of
healthy psychological development. '65 In addition, the authors note
that courts in fact do not act in the best interests of children because
they must balance the child's rights against competing adult interests,
including parental rights and policies of administrative agencies.66
The authors hope that the "less awesome and grandiose, more realis-
tic"67 standard will
serve to remind decisionmakers that their task is to salvage as much
as possible out of an unsatisfactory situation. It should reduce the
likelihood of the decisionmakers becoming enmeshed in the hope
and magic associated with "best," which often mistakenly leads
them in to believing that they have greater power for doing "good"
than "bad."968
Thus the authors propose replacing the "best interests" standard with
"the least detrimental alternative."
The authors define the least detrimental alternative as follows:
[T]hat specific placement and procedure for placement which maxi-
mizes, in accord with the child's sense of time and on the basis of
short-term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her
opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous
basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become his
psychological parent.6
9
This definition incorporates the five critical concepts expounded in
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, which are described in turn be-
low. Also described briefly below are the limited grounds for state
intervention set forth in Before the Best Interests of the Child.
i. The Child's Sense of Tme
The authors fear that placement decisions more often reflect the
adult's, as opposed to the child's, sense of time. "Unlike adults, who
have learned to anticipate the future and thus to manage delay, chil-
dren have a built-in time sense based on the urgency of their instinc-
tual and emotional needs."7 Children under two-years-old, for
instance, cannot endure more than a few days absence of their parents
without feeling overwhelmed. Time frames like months and years can
be "beyond comprehension" for children before adolescence.71
"Therefore, to avoid irreparable psychological injury, placement,
65. Id at 54.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 63.
68. Id.
69. Id at 53 (emphasis added).
70. d at 40.
71. Id at 40-41.
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whenever in dispute, must be treated as the emergency that it is for
the child."7 The authors warn in a footnote: "Three months may not
be a long time for an adult decisionmaker. For a young child it may
be forever."'73
ii. The Limitations of Knowledge
The authors believe that "[t]oo frequently there is attributed to law
and its agents a magical power-a power to do what is far beyond its
means."'74 Instead, law is properly seen as "a relatively crude instru-
ment... [having] neither.., the sensitivity nor the resources to main-
tain or supervise the ongoing day-to-day happenings between parent
and child .... ,75 As a result, the authors urge that prediction be
avoided, and, where inevitable, limited to "a few.., modest, generally
applicable short-term predictions. 76
iii. The Wanted Child
The authors insist: "Only a child who has at least one person whom
he can love, and who also feels loved, valued, and wanted by that
person, will develop a healthy self-esteem. '77 Offering a child the
chance "to become a wanted and needed member within a family
structure"78 provides children with the important advantage of sup-
porting his self-esteem, his love and regard for himself, and "conse-
quently his capacity to love and care for others, including his own
children.' '79 The authors repeatedly stress that a child's "primitive
and tenuous first attachments form the base from which any further
relationships develop."8
iv. Continuity of Relationships
The authors believe that "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surround-
ings, and environmental influence are essential for a child's normal
development."'' 8 Precisely because children's mental processes early
in their lives are unstable, their primary relationships must be stable
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id- at 43.
74. Id. at 49.
75. Id. at 49-50.
76. Id. at 52. In support of this principle, the authors cite three factors identified
by Anna Freud which "make-prediction difficult and hazardous": (1) possibly uneven
rates of maturation of ego and drive developments; (2) inability to quantify or to
foresee drive development; and (3) unpredictable "environmental happenings in a
child's life." Id. at 51 n.36.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id- at 21.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Id- at 18.
81. hM at 31-32.
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and represent uninterrupted support.' The authors note the different
consequences that disruptions of continuity produce at different ages:
in infancy, difficulties with sleeping and eating; in infants and toddlers,
separation anxieties leading to less trustful, more shallow, and indis-
criminate relationships; in older children under five, setbacks in
achievements such as toilet training, cleanliness, and speech; in
school-age children, achievements based on identification with the
parents' demands, prohibitions, and social ideals; and in adolescents,
possibly feelings of rejection and abandonment.8 3 For this reason, the
authors insist that "each child placement be final and unconditional
and that pending final placement a child must not be shifted to accord
with each tentative decision."'  The authors' commitment to con-
tinuity prompts their quite controversial position that, after a divorce,
"the noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable right to
visit the child, and the custodial parent should have the right to decide
whether it is desirable for the child to have such visits."
v. The Psychological Parent
The authors believe that an adult becomes a child's psychological
parent through "day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared
experiences. 8 6 An "absent, inactive adult" can never be a psycholog-
ical parent.'s Because "[u]nlike adults, children have no psychological
conception of relationship by blood-tie until quite late in their devel-
opment,"s the psychological parent may be either a biological parent
or a longtime caretaker with no legal claim.89 The authors urge deci-
sionmakers to prize this psychological relationship over traditionally
privileged relationships, including blood ties, to mirror the child's
attachment.
vi. Grounds For State Intervention
The trio's recommendations for placement with a psychological par-
ent cannot be applied properly without an understanding of the very
limited circumstances in which they would allow state intervention in
the first instance. Because the authors believe that the state can only
rarely offer alternatives which improve upon the opportunity to form
and maintain nurturing familial bonds in a child's existing family,
90
82. Id- at 32. "[E]motional attachments are tenuous and vulnerable in early life
and need stability of external arrangements for their development." Id. at 34.
83. Id at 32-34.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 54 (1979) [here-
inafter Before].
90. Id. at 11-14.
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they recognize only a few legitimate grounds for state intervention.
Legitimate grounds are limited to parental requests for the state to
place the child, requests by long-term caretakers to assume parental
rights or to give up the child, gross failures of parental care, and re-
fusal by parents to authorize lifesaving medical care. The child's need
for legal assistance is a ground for state intervention (in the form of
appointing counsel) only at the parents' request, or after an adjudica-
tion on one of the previously stated grounds, or after an emergency
removal of the child from the parents' custody.91
vii. Summary
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have thus laid out a proposal for those
faced with determining a child's best interests: place the child with his
psychological parent swiftly and permanently. As their second book
clarified, they believed that the state could legitimately consider the
child's "least detrimental alternative" only in stringently limited cir-
cumstances. As the following section demonstrates, however, neither
the authors nor their critics suggest that a simple application of these
principles equips a lawyer to address a client's best interests in all
cases and situations.
b. The Limits of the Psychological Parent Model in Informing the
Lawyer's Determination of Best Interests
Neither the authors nor their critics believe that the psychological
parent approach resolves the lawyer's concerns about best interests in
all circumstances. The authors themselves proffer their own unique
recommendations as to the role of the lawyer for children. Their crit-
ics fear that the psychological theories upon which their approach is
based are incomplete or wrong and that an inevitable bias against
poor families of color will result if the approach is not properly imple-
mented. This section first examines the authors' direct statements
about the role of the lawyer for children, and then the concerns of
their critics.
i. The Authors' Recommendations About the Role of the Lawyer
for Children
The authors believe, in the first instance, that children are presumed
to be represented before the law by their parents. "[A]n integral part
of the autonomy of parents is their authority and presumed capacity
to determine whether and how to meet the legal care needs for their
child... ."9 They continue:
The appointment of counsel for a child without regard to the wishes
of parents is a drastic alteration of the parent-child relationship. In-
91. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
92. Before, supra note 89, at 112.
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deed, it is in effect a disposition by the state. It intrudes upon the
integrity of the family and strains the psychological bonds that hold
it together. Therefore it cannot take place until the presumption of
parental autonomy has been overcome-until the protective insula-
tion that parents give children from the law has been broken by the
establishment at adjudication of a ground for [state] intervention.
93
Clearly, the authors believe that the appointment of counsel for a
child should be an unusual step.
Only when parents have, in a sense, forfeited their autonomy in
raising their children should the state impose counsel for the child on
the family. In addition, when imposed, counsel is "a disposition for a
limited purpose and a limited time. Such counsel are to act as lawyers,
not as parents. They are to represent a child's legal needs by gather-
ing and providing the court with information that it requires in order
to determine the least detrimental placement."
94
The authors formulate the role of the lawyer for children in a
number of different ways. The authors require that a child whose
placement is the subject of judicial proceedings should be represented
by counsel "who has no other goal than to determine what is the least
detrimental alternative for his client."'9 5 Counsel for the child "must
independently interpret and formulate his client's interests, including
the need for a speedy and final determination. '96 "[T]he role we
would assign to court-imposed counsel for a child is to advocate what,
in accord with statutory and case law, is in the child's best interests.
97
Unless the parents specifically delegate the role of directing counsel to
the child,98 the lawyer should seek the least detrimental alternative for
placement, usually with the psychological parent.
As to the necessary attributes of that lawyer, "[a] child's advocate
must, of course, be sufficiently knowledgeable about children and
their development to determine what information he must obtain and
present about the specific child he represents. Our guidelines should
93. Id. The authors suggest, for instance, that In re Gault "reaffirms the nght of a
child to have his own parents make decisions about what he needs." Id. at 129. The
authors read Gault as a strong statement of the right of parents to have their children
represented by counsel. Other commentators dispute this reading. See, e.g., Martin
Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Rep-
resentation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 89-90 (1984) (arguing that Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit ignore the concern for the child's personal autonomy underlying
Gault). Certainly, states following Gault have focussed primarily on the child's right
to counsel. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-136 (West 1995); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act
§ 249 (McKinney 1983 &.Supp. 1996).
94. Before, supra note 89, at 112.
95. Beyond, supra note 64, at 66.
96. Id. at 67.
97. Joseph Goldstein et al., In the Best Interests of the Child 90-91 (1986) [here-
inafter In] (describing views set forth in Before).
98. Before, supra note 89, at 128. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit prescribe that the
parent remain involved in the lawyer-child client relationship unless and until "the
presumption of parental autonomy has been overcome." Id. at 112.
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facilitate his task."9 9 Although this passage suggests that the guide-
lines could significantly inform a lawyer as to an individual client's
least detrimental alternative, in the third book, the authors make clear
that counsel's role should be limited and informed by consultation
with experts. 100 For instance, the authors chide a lawyer who offers an
opinion about the advisability of his client visiting her parents based
upon his own assessment of her possible mental illness or need for
treatment. 10 ' If the lawyer's job was to advocate for her "best inter-
est," the authors write, "he should have recognized the need to organ-
ize expert knowledge about the meaning of the visits for [the girl] in
order to equip the judge to make his decision."' 2 Similarly, the au-
thors urge a lawyer representing a child to base his decision whether
or not to push a case forward by being "informed by experts in child
development about his client's needs."'0 3
Thus, the authors themselves do not expect lawyers for children to
be able to determine a child's least detrimental alternative simply by
referencing their writings. In fact, in In The Best Interests of the Child,
the authors urge children's lawyers, as well as other professionals, to
stay within professional boundaries, cross professional borders with
care, avoid dual roles, recognize that they have no license to act as
parents, and remain both softhearted and hardheaded. This role faith-
fulness, born of the recognition that the parent alone is charged with
general responsibility for the child, while professionals must exercise
specialized limited responsibility,"° leads the authors to prefer that
lawyers do legal work and leave social work and mental health deter-
minations to experts in that field.10 5
ii. Critics' Concerns About the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit Model
As Patricia Wald has noted, Beyond "became a storm center.' 0 6 In
the foster-care context, 0 7 the trilogy provoked deep debate even as
many of the trilogy's principles were made law by admiring legislators
and judges. In the academic debate, in large part culminating in an
99. Beyond, supra note 64, at 67.
100. In, supra note 97, at 33, 78.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 78.
104. Id. at 3-5.
105. The authors also make other interesting points about lawyering for children,
relating to requiring one lawyer to represent all siblings, Before, supra note 64, at 116-
17, the special conundra of lawyers representing children in a class action, id. at 116,
and the widespread misconception that giving a child a lawyer is an unmitigated good.
Id. at 117.
106. Patricia M. Wald, The Kindness of Strangers, 97 Yale L. 1477, 1478 (1988)
(book review).
107. As noted in the historical summary above, the trio's ideas were received favor-
ably in the foster-care context, and resoundingly negatively in the divorce context.
Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 453 (1983).
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exceptionally thoughtful symposium held at Rutgers University and
published in the New York University Review of Law and Social
Change,08 commentators voiced three major related criticisms. First,
a number of readers roundly criticized the authors for using inappro-
priate or inadequate data and authority for the psychological princi-
ples underpinning their work. Second, one set of critics expressed
grave concern that the trio's work reflected an overly narrow and cul-
ture-bound view of families, which failed to recognize the existence
and success of diverse family forms larger than the two-parent nuclear
family.1' 9 Third, a number of commentators voiced their fears that
the authors' principles would be disproportionately harsh on poor
families and children. Each of these criticisms will be briefly
summarized.
First, mental health professionals criticized the psychological
parenting theory. One set of commentators at the 1983 Rutgers con-
ference noted that "parenting theory places too much emphasis on
identifying a particular most significant attachment figure, when it is
evident that there will often be several." 110 The trio's focus on a psy-
choanalytic perspective distorts the wide applicability of the principles
upon which they rely-because psychoanalytic research focuses on
disabled children with more limited coping skills, while research psy-
chologists examine nondisabled children, psychoanalytic conclusions
may underestimate the ability of most children to handle separation
or to form new relationships."' Critics fear that the trio derives con-
clusions about the effects of separation from studies of children who
have faced other traumas besides separation from parents, such as in-
stitutionalization, war, and severe deprivation of care. 1 2 Commenta-
tors consistently discuss the research of Michael Rutter, whose
108. Symposium, The Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision
Making, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 485 (1983-84). The Journal also plans to
publish proceedings of a follow-up symposium which took place in April 1994. 22
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change (forthcoming 1995-96).
109. This section will focus on the sociologically based critiques of the psychological
data relied upon in the trilogy. A larger substantive critique-attacking the mono-
tropic psychological parenting theory and preferring a "family network" approach
focusing on a web of supports for the child, rather than the dyadic mother-child rela-
tionship-is presented as Model Four below.
110. Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment
Theory: The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things for the
Wrong Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 505, 513 (1983-84) (citation
omitted).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Daniel Katkin et al., Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child- An Inquiry Into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social Action, 8
Law & Soc. Rev., 669, 675 (1974) (criticizing the authors for their failure to distin-
guish separation from deprivation). These commentators generally critique the first
book for its lack of a "single reference to any empirical study in the extensive litera-
ture on adoption and foster placement" and its "failure to review the literature." Id.
at 672.
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research suggests that the "effects associated with breaking of bonds
are significantly related to the circumstances surrounding the separa-
tion or loss, and are generally not long in duration."11 3 These com-
mentators fear the consequences of an overly broad and rigid
application of the trio's social policy guidelines, divorced from the evi-
dence and research which led to their psychoanalytic conclusions.
A second set of critics make many of the same points from sociolog-
ical and historical perspectives. These critics argue that because the
authors based their work on a nuclear family model, psychological
parenting fails to account for extended family models which prevail in
many non-American contexts." 4 For instance, "shared parenting re-
sponsibilities among kin" predominate in many Caribbean, African,
and African American contexts, in long-standing cultural patterns,
and as a hedge against poverty.115 Children raised under such circum-
stances experience a healthy "emotional universe" populated by peo-
ple in addition to their biological parent." 6 These commentators
caution that an overly narrow application of the Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit principles could lead child welfare professionals to search
mechanically for a single focus of attachment, find the biological par-
ents wanting in that regard, and sever parental bonds, removing the
child from a healthy family system." 7 Commentators stress that
113. Waters & Noyes, supra note 110, at 511.
114. Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 539, 540-41 (1983-84).
115. Id. at 541.
116. Committee on the Family, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, New
Trends in Child Custody Disputes 80-81 (1980), cited in Peggy C. Davis, Use and
Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 557,569
(1983-84).
117. Joseph Goldstein, in an interview published with the NYU Review of Law and
Social Change 1984 Symposium, notes that the notion of continuity set forth in
Beyond acknowledges extended family groupings:
We are very respectful of what families of different ethnic groups, origins or
economic status believe is best for their children. Our guidelines are much
more protective of a variety of family lifestyles than are many existing laws,
which are too broad and vague and put all too much discretion in the hands
of workers with middle-class notions about good childrearing.
... Te notion of continuity pertains to continuity of relationships, con-
tinuity of settings, continuity of lifestyles. Consider a child who has grown
up in a commune of some sort, and has had to leave the commune at an age
where that style of life is what she anticipates and thrives on. If the setting
was not the cause for the child's being removed, then every effort should be
made to place her in a similar setting to reduce the difficulty of the transfer
in terms of as many factors as possible.
Interview with Joseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 575, 580 (1983-84).
On December 2, 1995, at a conference in honor of the centenary of the birth of Anna
Freud, Joseph Goldstein reiterated that the trio's continuity guidelines would honor
one or more psychological parents. Comments of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud at
Yale, Developmental Concepts Updated & Applied (Dec. 2, 1995) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
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breaking the tie with the biological family can hamper, rather than
enhance, the child's development: "The disappearing act which is a
behavioral consequence of the psychological parenting theory is de-
structive to the child's developmental needs and utterly disrespectful
of the frailties of the human situation under conditions of poverty."",,
On the historical side, commentators have expressed their concern
that psychological parenting theory seeks to impose on everyone, for
all time, the concerns peculiar to a particular class at a particular time.
At the 1983 symposium, Linda Gordon linked the psychological
parenting focus on the mother to the "redefinition of women's labor
as housework and child care" precipitated by the wage labor system
that sent men out of the home to earn wages, as well as by the indus-
trial production system that took productive work out of the home. 19
She noted that full-time mothering and male breadwinning were char-
acteristic of urban, business, and professional families, and were sim-
ply not an option for rural and proletarian families.' 20  Gordon
concludes that, while children certainly need "continuing bonds with
particular people," she wished to call attention to the "social condi-
tions and class perspective that gave rise to this view of children's
needs," calling for "humility regarding the certainty and universality"
of psychological parenting theory.' 2 1
118. David Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating the Rights of Parents of Chil-
dren in Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 501, 503 (1983-84).
119. Linda Gordon, Child Abuse, Gender, and the Myth of Family Independence:
Thoughts on the History of Family Violence and its Social Control 1880-1920, 12
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 523,535-36 (1983-84) [hereinafter Thoughts on Family
Violence]; see also Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and His-
tory of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960, at 55-58, 84-86 (1988) (discussing the So-
ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children's effort to construct a new family
ideology according to a modem version of male supremacy where the father had total
responsibility for economic support and the mother was involved full-time in psycho-
logical development of children; noting great difficulty of the poor in conforming to
new family standards); Linda Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control,
in Women, the State, and Welfare 178, 187-93 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) (arguing that
poor urban mothers were extremely vulnerable to loss of their children given new
child-raising norms brought on by industrial capitalism); Nancy Chodorow & Susan
Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in Rethinking the Family: Some Femi-
nist Questions 54, 63-64 (Barrie Thome ed., 1982) (arguing that post-Freudian psy-
chology assumes the mother-child isolated unit that nineteenth-century industrial
development and cultural ideology produced and thus gives extraordinary significance
to early mother-infant relationship for psychological and emotional development of
the child); Ilene Philipson, Child Rearing Literature an Capitalist Industrialization, 26
Berkeley J. of Soc. 57, 57-73 (1981) (arguing that industrialization eroded the eco-
nomic foundation of the family, substituting emphasis on emotional attachment in the
mother-child relationship).
I thank Kimberley D. Harris, Yale Law School '96, for her research connected with
this subject.
120. Gordon, Thoughts on Family Violence, supra note 119, at 536.
121. Id. The period after World War II was a "unique historical juncture" for West-
em women as mothers, as more middle-class women than ever before in America and
Britain occupied an increasingly private and isolated sphere as full-time mothers.
Michael J. Bader & Ilene J. Philipson, Narcissism and Family Structure: A Social-
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A third, more political set of critiques springs from these insights.
Because child protective laws apply overwhelmingly to poor, non-
white families, these laws justify seizure of children from the politi-
cally powerless families "least involved in traditional forms of our
culture."122 Child protection laws are necessarily vague, requiring the
use of administrative discretion in their application. That discretion,
however, often "leads to discriminatory application of the laws that is
a function of cultural and class bias."'" In the context of a child wel-
fare system that may needlessly separate poor, nonwhite children
from their parents on an emergency basis, followed by long delays
until adjudication and disposition, "time is always on the side of the
current caretaker" to establish new psychological ties with the child.'
"The result," writes Martin Guggenheim, "is that a politically neutral
theory about human behavior works untold harm in actual prac-
tice."' According to Carol Stack, this theory allows us to accept "in-
tervention and intrusion in low-income families, and . . . [to]
discount[ ] the cultural backgrounds and solid parenting skills of low-
income parents."'2 6 Presumably, these commentators believe that the
Historical Perspective, 3 Psychoanalysis & Contemp. Thought 299, 314 (1980). Not
only did fertility rates peak in the twelve years after World War 1I, Paul England &
George Farkas, Households, Employment, and Gender. A Social, Economic, and
Demographic View- 12-13 (1986), but mass migration to the suburbs weakened ex-
tended family ties and left many women to raise their children in relative isolation.
Bader & Philipson, supra, at 315. Bader and Philipson argue that this set of unique
historical circumstances gave rise to a cultural and scientific idealization of the
mother-child dyad, in which "[m]othering took on such ideological significance in the
1940s and '50s that a new host of experts arose to deal with every imaginable problen
a mother might encounter, and to warn of every possible disaster that might arise if
she were not constantly vigilant." Id. at 316; see also Ann Dally, Inventing Mother-
hood: The Consequences of an Ideal 96 (1982) (noting that among the complex
mechanisms behind the postwar idealization of motherhood was the need for women
to leave industrial jobs which they had held in wartime in order to make room for
returning male veterans); Representations of Motherhood 6 (Donna Bassin et al. eds.,
1994) (noting the "concerted postwar shift to return women to the home"); cf. Juliet
B. Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure 83-105
(1991) (arguing that the postwar idealization of the isolated mother-child dyad was
the culmination of an economic process beginning in the nineteenth century to re-
move paid work from the home and to restrict women to unpaid housekeeping tasks;
ironically, these tasks consumed more time even as household investment in ostensi-
bly labor saving capital equipment (e.g., washing machines, dishwashers) increased in
the periods immediately before and after World War II); Reva B. Siegel, Home As
Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-
1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073 (1994) (tracing women's resistance as early as the 1850s to
the shift from a household economy in which women were paid for work brought into
the home to one in which women were restricted to unpaid child-rearing and
housework).
122. Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the Psychological
Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 549, 549 (1983-84).
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. at 551.
125. Id.
126. Stack, supra note 114, at 547.
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trio's high thresholds for initial state intervention are not being prop-
erly followed, while their requirements of permanent placement with
psychological parents are followed.' 2 7 These commentators fear that
failure to completely incorporate the trio's guidelines into law dis-
counts, disrespects, and damages many healthy, nurturing, poor non-
white families.'28
In short, critics who generally respect the learned trio and their in-
tentions fear that their elegantly clear prescriptions may lead to an
overbroad application of only half of their proposals. Applying psy-
choanalytically learned materials in the broad context of all children
underestimates the particular child's ability to cope with separation.
The "nuclear family" predicate leads the trio to ignore therapeutic
family structures that differ from the traditional mother-child dyad.
The propensity of an overtaxed, potentially classist system to heed the
trio's urge to sever parental bonds without applying their recommen-
dations for restraint in intervening in the family in the first place has
led to a system more prone to penalizing poor, nonwhite families for
nontraditional family structures. These critiques have led to another
distinct definition of best interests, known as the family network
model, discussed next.
127. As noted earlier, it is critical to perceive the trio's recommendations of limited
state intervention and psychological parent placement as a package. See supra notes
92-105 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, it appears that in many contexts the
trio's recommendations for psychological parent placement have been followed while
the high threshold for state intervention has been ignored. Garrison, supra note 107,
at 475-77.
128. In response, Joseph Goldstein notes:
It is not just child placement where the poor are disadvantaged, nor is it the
result of anything we have said in our books. The experiment on poor fami-
lies was being carried out long before our guidelines. If anything, the guide-
lines are intended to hold in check the experiment.... We are trying to stay
the hand of the state. We hope we have provided a basis for the poor to
challenge what social workers do, what child care workers do, and to call
into question what has been happening.
Interview With Joseph Goldstein, supra note 117, at 582. Professor Goldstein also
countered claims that continuity of setting presupposed financial ability and middle
class or higher status:
There is an order of importance in continuity. We talk about interpersonal
relationships with an adult. That is number one and it has nothing to do with
money. Then we talk about continuity of surroundings. Now the surround-
ings may be poor or rich, but we try to'protect themn to the extent we can.
One of the things that emerges from our guidelines is that it ought to be the
state's first priority, if it really believes in the child's well being, to provide
the minimum financial basis the family needs, the minimum nourishment
base, the minimum shelter base, whatever best serves the development of
continuous relationships. In fact, if the only reason that a mother or father
can't continue to care for the child is because they have no place to live, or
no money to buy food, then we would call it child abuse by the state if the
state for that reason removed the child from her family.
Id. at 580-81.
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4. The Family Network Model
In response to concerns raised by psychological parenting theory,
Peggy Cooper Davis, a New York University law professor and a for-
mer New York City family court judge, has identified a new consensus
among research scientists, clinicians, and child welfare practitioners.
The new consensus rejects the "monotropic view" that a child's devel-
opment depends primarily upon the quality of his attachment to one
person and instead examines how children thrive in a network of
relationships.
a. The Recognition that Children Form Attachments With Multiple
Caregivers in a Family Network
Professor Davis suggests instead a focus on "a supportive milieu in
which caregiving is shared among several adults with whom the child
is familiar."' 29  Davis relies upon research compiled by Louis W.C.
Tavecchio and Marinus H. van IJzendoorn concluding that "the opti-
mal caregiving arrangement would consist of a network of stable and
secure attachment relationships between the child and both its parents
and other persons such as professional caregivers, members of the
family, or friends."' 30 These researchers conclude that "[i]n research,
attachment should be considered in light of a network of relationships
the child builds up in the first years of life."'
13
Tavecchio and van HIzendoorn further conclude that "[g]iven the
inevitability of temporary separations, the optimal rearing context
will, from the child's perspective, be made up by more or less stable
relationships with several different caregivers who all act as attach-
ment figures."' 3 In what these researchers call "an extended rearing
context, a separation from an attachment figure does not automati-
cally imply a separption as perceived by the child: there are a number
of caregivers who may provide the same source security in potentially
threatening situations.' 33 Davis cites other research that acknowl-
edges that children recognize a "hierarchy of attachment figures, each
of whom may [be] qualitatively different." ''  Davis also finds support
129. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent-
ing Theory, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change (forthcoming 1995-1996) (manuscript at
39, on file with N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change).
130. Id. at 24 (citing Marinus H. van Uzendoorn and Louis Tavecchio, The Devel-
opment of Attachment Theory as a Lakafosian Research Program: Philosophical and
Methodological Aspects, in Attachment in Social Networks 24-25 (1987)).
131. Id. (emphasis added)
132. Id. at 25 (citing Tavecchio and van IJzendoorn, Perceived Security and Exten-
sion of the Child's Rearing Context" A Parent-Report Approach, in Attachment in
Social Networks 39-40 (1987)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 26 (citing James H. Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affecting Custodial and
Visitation Arrangements, 9 Behavioral Sci. & the L. 419 (1991)). Davis also cites Bray
for the proposition that the notion of "one psychological parent" is "controversial and
has very little empirical support." Id.
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within the cross-cultural research, including studies done in western
Kenya135 and the southern United States, 3 6 which identify multiple
caretakers in a family network to be normative and therapeutically
sound for children.
Finally, Davis relies upon psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin's theory
of intersubjectivity that challenges "the valorization of the omnipres-
ent, omnicompetent, almost always maternal, parenting figure."'
1 37
This notion "lies behind"13 the psychological parenting theory:
In Benjamin's view, the infant has an ability to recognize, to enjoy,
and to grow in reaction to the experience of the mother's subjectiv-
ity. The expectation that mother will be omnipotent and subject to
the child's will leaves the child in a dominating isolation, with an
illusion of "mastry," but no sense of otherness.'
39
Davis summarizes:
The work of parenting-of caring for children and helping them to
grow-includes the work of meeting their physical needs and pro-
viding basic comfort. But it is not the work of protecting the illu-
sion of the omnipotent mother who satisfies all wants. It is the work
of helping [children]-gently, lovingly, playfully-to grow in health
and to learn to relate in health to other independent minds.'40
Thus, Davis downplays the importance of a single psychological par-
ent in favor of recognizing the value and validity of a network of sup-
portive caregivers for a child.
Davis challenges the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit principles in three
ways. First, she notes her concerns that the work of psychological par-
ent theorists "does not acknowledge cultural and subcultural differ-
ences (and arguably underestimates age differences) in the reaction of
children to separations."'' Second, she writes that these theorists
"minimize the importance to the child of all but the most intense cur-
rent bond."' 42 Third, Davis fundamentally conceives "everyday sepa-
rations," as opposed to clearly harmful "long-term and other
135. Id. at 20 (citing Charles M. Super and Sara Harkness, The Development of
Affect in Infancy and Early Childhood, in Cultural Perspectives on Child Develop-
ment 1, 15 (Daniel A. Wagner & Harold W. Stevenson eds., 1982)).
136. Id- at 22-23 (citing Shirley Brice Heath, Ways With Words: Language, Life
and Work in Communities and Classrooms 116-17, 121 (1983)).
137. Letter from Peggy Cooper Davis, N.Y.U. School of Law, to Jean Koh Peters,
Yale Law School (October 3, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
138. Id. (emphasis omitted).
139. Davis, supra note 129, at 36 (citing Jessica Benjamin, The Omnipotent Mother,
in Representations of Motherhood 133 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994) and Jerome
Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds 59-62, 73-77 (1986)).
140. Davis, The Good Mother, supra note 129, at 41 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id. at 28. Note that Joseph Goldstein includes in his definition of "continuity
of settings" settings beyond the parental dyad, as long as "the setting was not the
cause for the child's being removed." Interview with Joseph Goldstein, supra note 117,
at 580.
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traumatic separation" from caregivers, as "constructive learning ex-
periences" that aid a child's development. 43 Davis suggests that
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit view separations from beloved caregivers
as uniformly harmful and dangerous to the "stability and uninter-
rupted support" that children need during invariably painful develop-
mental initiatives.'" Davis recommends that children be encouraged
to confront rather than deny routine and short-term separation. In
sum, Davis's "family network" model defines an emotional universe
of attachments which, while of differing weight and depth, all interact
to create a healthy milieu for the child's development.
b. The Limits of the Family Network Model in Informing the
Lawyer's Determination of Best Interests
Davis's alternative model of best interests resolves some nagging
problems created by the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit psychological
parenting approach, by offering promising avenues for a broader,
more "culturally competent"' 45 vision of the family. The family net-
work model acknowledges roles for noncustodial parents and ex-
tended family members in the emotional development of the child. It
resembles models that have worked in non-contemporary, non-Anglo-
American contexts for generations. Additionally, it creates a model
for understanding and evaluating the extended family systems devel-
143. Davis, supra note 129, at 9.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Richard Dudley, a behavioral scientist who participated in the 1994 Rutgers
symposium, gives examples of important ethno-cultural considerations in the child
welfare system's work with African American families. Richard Dudley, Deciding
What's Best for Children: Recognizing the Role of Ethnicity and Culture, 22 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change (forthcoming 1995-1996) (manuscript on file with the N.Y. U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change). He defines "culturally competent child welfare-decisionmak-
ing" to require:
the full integration of ethno-cultural issues into the overall knowledge base
that informs both the assessment and the planning process; the development
of the assessment and planning skills required to manage those ethno-cul-
tural issues; and the ongoing work required to remain sensitive to the fact
that the differences between one's own ethnocentric view of the world and
that of other ethno-cultural groups must be respected and appropriately
addressed.
Id at 10. Dudley notes, for example, that African American families are often part of
a
multi-generational extended family network that includes biologically-re-
lated and non-biologically-related ("adopted") kin, who provide emotional
and economic support when it is needed. These families are often further
characterized by a flexibility in and an overlapping of roles and functions; a
flexibility in the boundaries between households; and a subjugation of indi-
vidual concerns in the interests of family survival. Children raised in families
that function in this manner may have numerous adults in their lives who
share parenting functions, and they may even move in and out of their bio-
logical parents' household....
Id. at 13-14. Dudley also comments on the "daily experience of racism" experienced
by African Americans from birth. IL at 15.
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oped by many nonwhite or poor families in America who may have
been found wanting under the monotropic psychological parenting
approach.
In fact, the Davis model, unlike the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
model, may provide a prescriptive model that also describes family
systems across social class in the United States. Just as a single
mother on AFDC, who relies on extended family members locally and
"down south" to care for her children could be found to be part of a
therapeutic family network, a rich working couple who relies on full-
time day care providers and regular babysitting, as well as local and
distant family, could similarly be understood to provide a family net-
work for their children. By removing the focus on mothers, Davis's
model sees the conscientious parent of any gender and any class as an
important part of an integrated web of attachments which a healthy
happy child will enjoy during her development.
Ongoing debate of the "emerging consensus" about family
networking has just begun. Certainly, the model fails in its current
form to provide clear guidelines as to what distinguishes a therapeutic
family network from a malfunctioning one. While lawyers for chil-
dren, through the use of genograms 14 6 and a careful understanding of
the child's daily life, can discern who is in the child's emotional uni-
verse, they have no direction as to how to evaluate the quality and
deficiencies of that universe. While the model offers an excellent al-
ternative paradigm to the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit single psycho-
logical parent, it currently does not provide concrete ideas as to
intervention, foster care, and permanency planning in the way that the
trio's model does.
5. Summary of the Prevailing Models
Each of the prevailing models of determining best interests used by
lawyers for children is partly useful and partly troubling. The total
lawyer discretion model recognizes the inevitable remainder of lawyer
discretion that will enter a representation, but fails to cabin that dis-
cretion with principles which will ensure other-centric decision mak-
ing or even consistency among the representations of the same
attorney. The expert opinion model, in its three forms, is inadequate:
professionals already involved with the client are often rightly con-
strained by ethics and history from disclosing all they know about a
child's best interests; lawyer-retained experts are expensive and thus
currently available to very few lawyers; and court-appointed experts
serve the court and announce their opinions too late to be useful in
structuring an attorney's representation.
146. A genogram is a method for drawing a family tree that records information
about family members and the relationships over at least three generations. See gener-
ally Monica McGoldrick & Randy Gerson, Genograms in Family Assessment (1985).
This book is a helpful manual for constructing genograms in client work.
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The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit psychological parenting model has
captured the discourse and in many ways deepened lawyers' basic un-
derstanding of child developmental needs. The model has exhorted
children's lawyers to treat time as precious and to put their client's
perspective first. Its monotropic focus of power in a single psychologi-
cal parent, its failure to account for many healthy forms of multiple
caretaker family structures, and the disparate impact of its partial im-
plementation, however, have led to serious concerns that the model,
unwittingly, has compounded the disparity of treatment between rich
and poor families. The Davis family network model thoughtfully ad-
dresses many of these concerns by offering an alternative paradigm,
but needs to be discussed in greater detail before it can provide true
guidance to the practitioner.
B. Towards An Integrated Model: Guidelines for the Lawyer for
Children in Making Determinations of Best Interests
Recognizing the thoughtful considerations which gave rise to each
of the above models, as well as the critical historical role played by
each model in its time, the integrated model attempts to preserve the
best of each paradigm while discarding the historically outdated or the
unintentionally harmful. This Article's model borrows and benefits
from each of the models described above. Because the lawyer must
make best interests determinations from day one of each case, even
before she meets or knows her client, some lawyer discretion is inevi-
table. Proper deference when appropriate to experts, already in-
volved with the case, appointed by the court, or retained by the
lawyer, will be critical in many cases. Especially early in the case, ref-
erence to many of the Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein princi-
ples will be extremely beneficial to the client, particularly the client's
sense of time and the primacy of the child's development. Like the
Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein model, this integrated model
requires the lawyer to strive constantly to see the past, present, and
future options from the child's point of view and to coax others con-
stantly to do the same. Where a psychological parent is clearly in
place and able to care for the child, he must be taken very seriously.
As prompted by Davis's family network model, the lawyer must also
look beyond the traditional mother-child dyad to alternative family
arrangements which provide children with the stability needed for
their development through an integrated family network.
The model of determining a child's best interests that I espouse re-
quires a principled process based substantively on the uniqueness of
each child client. In addition to the description which follows, the
model is set forth in step-by-step fashion in part D of the Recommen-
dations Section of this Article.
With respect to process, the attorney must base her determination
of best interests on a full, efficient, and speedy factual investigation
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that leads the lawyer to a deep understanding of the child's family
system, her history, and her daily life. A lawyer can track the progress
of her factual investigation by sketching these three perspectives on
the child's life through genograms, chronologies, and daily schedules.
A conscientious process, which involves the client's own words and
desires at every possible point, will, I believe, lead the lawyer to a
complex, three-dimensional understanding of who the child client is,
what she wants, and why she wants it. This deep understanding, and a
careful respect for the desires the child expresses, must form the foun-
dation of the lawyer's options for the representation. This starting
point, therefore, returns the question of best interests to the context of
the representation of a particular child; while any discussion of best
interests implicates fascinating theoretical issues with which the child's
lawyer must contend, the lawyer must make actual decisions about
best interests in the contexts of the child's unique personality and
desires.
Next, when removal of the child from her home is an option, the
lawyer must consider the child's current predicament not in isolation,
but in comparison to the actual alternative options that foster care pro-
vides. For instance, if a baby appears not to be receiving optimal care
in his home, but the state foster-care system is known to lack adequate
foster homes for babies that age in the local area, the lawyer must
factor that reality into her reasoning. Otherwise, lawyers are tempted
to see the current home situation in isolation, focused more on what is
suboptimal about the child's care than on what the state can actually
provide instead. 47 The child faces a concrete set of alternatives at any
moment in best interests analysis; the lawyer must understand the re-
alities of each before determining a client's best interests.
Next, the lawyer must evaluate the actual alternative options in
terms of the psychological parent and family network paradigms that
Models Three and Four have set forth. The lawyer should methodi-
cally and thoughtfully compare the child's family system, history, and
daily life with the priorities and concerns laid out by Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit, and Davis. If the child's family history can be understood
clearly in terms of one particular model, the lawyer may be able to
eliminate from consideration some of the actual alternative options.
For instance, a child who clearly had one primary caretaker from
whom she has experienced a separation, and who is clearly in crisis,
147. As the Recommendations of the Fordham Conference note, these "actually
available alternatives" should also include alternatives that can be created through
innovative lawyering, including law reform. Recommendations of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Profession of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301 (1996)
[hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference] (part IV.B.3.d.). For instance, the
lawyer may believe she can compel the system to create an excellent foster placement
for a client even though one does not currently exist. Nevertheless, lawyers must be
realistic, although not fatalistic, about what they may ultimately be able to obtain for
their clients.
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may also have no family network to speak of. Available alternatives
which would place the child in a network of care with no single
caregiver would appear to be inappropriate. The lawyer should ex-
plore with the client ways to reunite her with that caregiver, while
exploring ways to create a larger group of community ties, including
extended relatives, counselors, school personnel, and role models like
Big Sisters, to afford the child some outlets for support and relation-
ship while the primary relationship is being repaired. In another ex-
ample, a child clearly may be living in the midst of an inner city family
network, with a beleaguered potential psychological parent figure in
crisis. If the network can support the child adequately, there may be
no need to move the child to a foster home. It may also aid the child
to shore up the psychological parent with supportive services, to af-
ford the child the security of that special relationship.
Lawyers must continue to deepen their understanding of the rich
and complex debates about child development that continue in other
disciplines. At the present time, the psychological parent and the fam-
ily network paradigms help lawyers benefit from these debates at
some level of sophistication.' 48 The alternative paradigms may at
least offer clarity about the changes that a child is undergoing. For
instance, a client may be raised by a psychological parent, who has
disabilities which prevent her from caring for the child further; the
child then may be moved into a foster home that provides a family
network of caring and love, without one clearly identified substitute
for the biological mother's psychological parenting. While a tradi-
tional psychological parent perspective may cause a court or a child
welfare bureaucracy to underestimate the strength of the ties devel-
oped by the child in this foster placement, a healthy respect for mod-
els of alternative family networks can help the lawyer and the court to
examine the foster placement with an open mind, with an eye towards
consolidating its strengths. When the lawyer feels that she cannot sort
through the many factors contributing to best interests, she may need
to seek expert assistance. In one such case, our office retained a social
worker to work with us to determine whether or not the foster family
network would or could offer our client a permanent home, before
consenting to the adoption of our client by third parties. 49
If lawyers are to be open to hybrid forms of these two paradigms,
how is a lawyer to assess when a hybrid option for the client becomes
simply chaos, rather than a "diversified portfolio" of caring
148. See id., part mH.D. Lawyers should be aware that the understandings of child
development and placement issues in other disciplines are dynamic and constantly
changing. The paradigms discussed here will certainly shift, evolve, and probably be
replaced in the coming years.
149. This example, taken from my practice, marked my first real understanding of
the potential limits of the psychological parent perspective and the necessity of addi-
tional child welfare paradigms. I thank Mona Scales, our social work consultant on
the case, for her thoughtful and eye-opening teaching about this critical issue.
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caregivers? The key indicator, it would seem, would be the actual
progress of the child's development. Because each paradigm seeks, in
the end, to safeguard and promote the child's development, the first
by providing a stable, reliable, loving figure, the second by exposing
the child to a panoply of loving others, the ultimately successful para-
digm for each child will be the one, or the combination of the two,
which actually aids her development. Thus, the lawyer should remain
concerned about a child who is inappropriately aggressive, or morose,
or hyperactive, and look closely at the structure of her contemporane-
ous home life. The child who is growig well, adjusting adequately at
school, and interacting within normal parameters with her peers, de-
spite an unusual family structure, should be presumed, to some extent,
to be benefitting from the current structure of her home. This is not
to say that there is always, or even usually, a direct correlation be-
tween sweet, well-behaved children and therapeutic homes, or ill-tem-
pered children and chaotic homes. I suggest, rather, that attorneys for
children must be open to the wide range of idiosyncratic family struc-
tures that may benefit children, and make changes to a child's family
life only when the child's development is clearly at risk.
When these developmental conclusions are clearly complex, lawyers
must consult experts for guidance. In a world of excellent resources,
lawyers could retain mental health experts to consult closely on issues
of best interests for their clients; this is, I believe, our ethical duty to
supplement our lack of expertise.15 0 In the current world of limited
resources, lawyers can also take advantage of pre-existing experts or
community resources who can come into the child's life as counselors,
teachers, and support people, but only, as noted above, if attorneys
can remain mindful of the critical role these professionals play and
their ethical duties beyond the court proceedings. When all else fails,
the lawyer may also be able to convince the court that a court-ap-
pointed expert is critical. This route, however, is especially a concern
when a client has a fixed perspective on her case-the lawyer may
advocate for the entrance of a very credible witness who will in the
end contradict the child's point of view.
If the analysis under the three models of expert deference, psycho-
logical parenting, and family network is inconclusive, either because
none of the models point in a particular direction or because the mod-
els are in conflict, in the end the lawyer is left with the unavoidable
remainder: her own judgment and discretion. Unlike the Total Dis-
cretion model, however, the lawyer reverts to her own judgment as a
last resort only after a full investigation, which leads to a three-dimen-
sional understanding of the child and her actual options; an explora-
tion of the psychological parent and family network paradigms and
150. Chapter Seven of the book explores those collaborations in more depth, and
suggests some ways to resolve the current resource crunch preventing children's law-
yers from retaining these professionals. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2.
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their applicability to the child; and a thorough consideration of how
and when experts might be helpful to the representation. Moreover,
whenever possible, the lawyer should decline to choose among accept-
able options and advocate for multiple options, while opposing op-
tions that the foregoing analysis may have rejected.
In addition, I propose two additional constraints. First, in a murky
world, where best interests cannot be easily discerned and a decision
in either direction can be justified, the lawyer should err on the side of
seeking to keep the current family structure intact, while advocating
aggressively for state interventions that ameliorate the worrisome
conditions in the home.15 1 This default implements a view that Gold-
stein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein, as well as Davis, and many con-
cerned experts clearly share: the value of minimal state intervention,
the harm of precipitous removal of children, and the importance of
seeking in every instance the least detrimental alternative.152 This de-
fault also acknowledges the trauma that the child will experience
when she separates precipitously from her family.
Second, at the end of any given decision-making process, the lawyer
must return to the child's subjective view of the question at hand.
How does the best interests decision that the lawyer has reached
match the child's desires? How does the decision reflect what is
unique and essential about the child? At this moment, the lawyer
should return to consider the "seven questions to keep lawyers for
children honest."'153 As always, the lawyer should ask both how the
child benefits concretely from the lawyer's decision making and also
examine whether the lawyer's adult perspectives and needs are play-
ing an unduly large role in the process. If multiple acceptable options
remain, the lawyer should present evidence and argument describing
all these options to the court while also presenting evidence and argu-
ment opposing all rejected options. Thus, in the end, the best interests
determination must end where it began: with the attorney trying to
see the decision to be made from the child's subjective perspective,
with a focus on the child's uniqueness and individuality. This struc-
ture of decision making, starting and ending with the child, consider-
ing the child's circumstances in light of the two paradigms, and
151. Martin Guggenheim would ground this default rule in the substantive law in
every state recognizing the child's right to be raised by her parents absent a court
finding of unfitness. Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1429-30. By contrast, Peter Mar-
gulies would ground this presumption in honoring the value of connection and com-
mitment in children's lives. Margulies, supra note 10, at 1482, 1493-94.
152. Dr. Solnit, in a discussion at the 1983 Rutgers Symposium, agreed with other
participants that the state fails to support low-income families who are at risk of los-
ing their children. "Deprived, confused parents would not have to lose their children,
as they do all too often now, if we were more effective in providing supportive serv-
ices for children and their parents in the home, and if we knew how to provide volun-
tary services that were attractive and accessible." Solnit/Fanshel Discussion, 12 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 517, 518 (1983-84).
153. These questions are outlined in the Introduction, supra
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seeking the input of experts when needed, reduces the range of lawyer
discretion to acceptable levels.
Two examples follow to demonstrate briefly the way in which a law-
yer could implement this integrated model; a more detailed discussion
of the concrete execution of the model appears in Chapter Eight, of
the book."
Miguel: You are appointed to represent Miguel, a thirteen-year-old
boy who is the subject of child protective proceedings due to the
death of his grandmother, who has taken care of him since birth.
He has had minimal contact with his parents since his birth. You
meet him shortly after you are appointed, minutes before the first
court proceedings. He mentions that many members of his family
live in town. Since his grandmother's death, he has been living with
his cousin, Luisa, who is nineteen and the mother of a one-year-old
baby boy. He wants to stay there. You convince the court to let
him remain there.
In court, Miguel gives you permission to read his Department of
Child Welfare file and you agree to meet him at his home the next
week one day after school. The file is very thin; Miguel's grand-
mother and cousin had no previous contacts with the Department.
The fie reflects that Miguel is often truant from school, especially in
the last three months; he is in good health. You speak with the
caseworker, who has met Miguel and Luisa only once, and knows
little about him.
When you arrive at his home the next week, he is not there. You
learn from Luisa that as soon as he began to live with her, his be-
havior deteriorated: he is seen by police on several occasions with
gang members known to sell drugs, he does not attend school, and
he is often out until two in the morning. Despite your best efforts,
you are unable to see him again.
Two weeks later, Miguel is arrested on charges of possession of
drugs. When you arrive at court to meet with him, Miguel's great-
aunt introduces herself and tells you that she wants Miguel to live
with her. You agree to speak with her after you have seen Miguel.
You meet him in detention after learning that the prosecutor is
seeking extended pretrial detention due to his truancy and home
history. Miguel tells you that his great-aunt has offered to take him
into her home, also offering to become his guardian on the under-
standing that he will abide by her strict rules and curfews. Miguel is
honestly confused about what he wants, desperately wants to get
out of detention immediately, and asks you what you think he
should do. How do you counsel your client?
Analysis: Miguel's lawyer should begin with a clear understanding
of what Miguel wants, both in terms of objectives of the representa-
tion and feedback from the lawyer. Miguel's nonnegotiable wishes
are to leave detention. His request is for advice as to the best
154. Peters, Representing Children, supra note 2. The integrated model is also set
forth step-by-step in the Recommendations Section of this Article, infra, part III.
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course of action which achieves this goal. The lawyer should also
note that she does not know Miguel or his family well, lacking even
the information a less harried second meeting with her client would
have provided.
In that light, the lawyer should assess Miguel's actually available
options:
(1) release to great-aunt, on her terms;
(2) stay in detention (eliminated from serious consideration
based on Miguel's stated wish);
(3) release to stranger foster home (unlikely);
(4) release to Luisa (unlikely); or
(5) release to other family members.
Next, the lawyer should assess those options in light of the two
alternative paradigms of family structure. A psychological parenting
approach might suggest that the great-aunt is the best option to pro-
vide Miguel with the psychological parent that he lost when his
grandmother died. Because she is the most prominent option, the
lawyer should explore carefully with Miguel his feelings about his
great-aunt, and think through the pros and cons of living with her.
The lawyer should also interview the aunt, to learn about her family
history, the structure of her home, and her plan for caring for Mi-
guel. If she appears to offer a stable home for Miguel, it is probably
true that courts would currently welcome a strong new parenting
figure and give that figure great deference, and perhaps give Miguel
a fresh start, when considering the issues of detention and sentenc-
ing. The lawyer should also discuss with Miguel the strict rules that
his great-aunt proposes, the positive light in which a court would
probably view them, and the negative light in which the court would
see a second failed family placement, should Miguel not abide by
the rules.
The lawyer should also explore at least briefly Miguel's feelings
about his time with Luisa. The court will need an explanation as to
why Miguel will behave better at the great-aunt's home, when he
did not adjust well to Luisa's home. Learning Miguel's perspective
on his cousin will be important to the lawyer's getting to know Mi-
guel and his perceptions of his own needs. The lawyer also needs to
know whether Miguel still hopes that living with Luisa in the future
is an option.
Psychological parent analysis would also recognize, as well, the
deep trauma that losing his grandmother represents. The lawyer
should broach the topic of his grandmother's death with Miguel, to
gauge his willingness and ability to talk about it. It may well be, for
instance, that Miguel's recent behavior, both his truancy and his
late-night behavior, stems from his grief and loss. If Miguel is un-
derstandably unwilling or unable to discuss these issues with his
lawyer, she should think about creative ways to offer Miguel the
option of professional expert assistance in dealing with his grand-
mother's death, through referrals to community counseling or the
use of resources already available to Miguel (from school, religious
affiliation, and the like). Crucially, involving these resources will
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increase his chances of leaving detention permanently and receiving
a more lenient sentence should he be convicted in the criminal
proceeding.
If Miguel is ambivalent or negative about living with his great-
aunt, the family network model offers another option for the lawyer
to explore. The many other local family members may individually,
or collectively, be able to offer him an alternative home. If Miguel
gives his permission, the lawyer can contact these family members
to see if they can propose an alternative. This proposal will take
time and, because it does not get Miguel out of detention that day,
may offer at best a backup plan if living with his great-aunt does not
work out.
Because Miguel's main goal is to avoid detention, it is fair to
counsel him that his great-aunt is his best hope for release from
detention and seems like the available option in his best interests.
The lawyer should also make a plan to keep in touch with Miguel
and the aunt, and ask Miguel if he wants her to explore his extended
family network for backup options.
Thomas: You have represented Thomas, an eighteen-month-old,
for nine months. You were appointed when he was originally the
subject of neglect petitions based on his mother's failure to attend
medical appointments for his infant skin disease, which has cleared
up. He has lived since birth with his mother, who is Haitian and
speaks Creole and only a little English. His mother has recently
given birth to twins. She has mild mental retardation and a mixed
track record of keeping appointments for his medical and develop-
mental visits and her prenatal visits at the local health plan.
Throughout your representation of the children, she has lived with
Thomas with a variety of family members, including her father,
aunts, and uncles.
Soon after the twins were born, you visited her home before court
and observed broken windows and damaged walls. Thomas's
mother reports that her boyfriend is responsible for the condition of
the apartment, but refuses to say more. You learn from the child
welfare worker that she has seen roaches and rats in the apartment.
The worker is seriously considering removing Thomas due to the
conditions in the home.
At the home, you also observe your client. Thomas is playing ac-
tively, riding toys throughout the small apartment, and offering you
books in English to read. His mother tells you, however, that he
sleeps much of the day, with active periods only in the morning and
early evening.
Throughout your representation, Thomas has appeared well-ad-
justed and happy. He appears comfortable and happy when with
his mother. Thomas speaks Creole and some English, and seems to
understand you when you speak to him. Developmental evalua-
tions have found him within normal ranges and recommended fol-
low-up at the local health plan. The mother has missed a number of
the follow-up visits sporadically.
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One developmental report noted that the mother had a great deal
of animosity for Thomas's father, who she has not seen since before
Thomas was born. The mother has told you that Thomas is "like his
father-selfish and nasty." Nevertheless, neither you nor any of the
case workers who have worked with the family have ever seen evi-
dence of any neglect or maltreatment of Thomas, apart from the
various missed medical appointments.
Based upon your knowledge of the current foster care resources,
you believe that Thomas, if removed, will probably be placed in the
next city, a one and one half hour bus ride from his mother, and
probably will live in a non-Creole speaking household.
Analysis: Beginning with the child's perspective, the child appears
comfortable and happy with his mother. He has never known any
life beyond her care and the company of his extended family. You
find it odd that an eighteen-month-old boy should be sleeping much
of the day, and tell his mother that you plan to talk to the child's
developmental treatment people at the local health plan about that.
You also ask her to take him for a medical checkup concerning the
possible effect on him of having rats and roaches in the apartment
with him.
Thomas's actually available options are:
(1) remain with his mother in the current apartment;
(2) remain with his mother in another place;
(3) live with a relative;
(4) live in foster care with strangers.
Under a strict psychological parenting model, this mother's cur-
rent situation raises great concern. The strain of raising three chil-
dren, her postpartum condition, and the disrepair of the apartment
could be taken to suggest that she is overwhelmed with her current
responsibilities. You are concerned that her current boyfriend, if
responsible for the damage to the apartment, has a violent temper.
Initially, you wonder whether Thomas would be safer in another
home.
A number of factors should prevent the lawyer from seeking re-
moval at this time. First, under the psychological parent theory,
there are a number of services that can be provided to Thomas's
mother immediately to prevent Thomas's separation from her.
Thomas's lawyer should work immediately with the mother's lawyer
and the child welfare worker to advocate for speedy repair and ex-
termination of the apartment, or alternative housing. Until these
repairs or alternatives are arranged, Thomas's lawyer should moni-
tor the case worker's progress and Thomas's situation daily. The
child's lawyer should also explore with the mother's attorney
whether adequate postpartum support is available to the mother.
Referral to a community agency that could support the mother dur-
ing this difficult adjustment period could be especially useful. Be-
cause Thomas has lived all his life with his mother, the prospect of
separation, especially in a distant, distinct foster placement, should
be an absolute last resort.
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The extensive family network which has previously housed the
family should be explored as an alternative home for Thomas's
mother and the three children. The family network may also offer
support and extra hands for Thomas's mother during the first weeks
of the twins' lives. If Thomas is particularly close to a grandparent
or aunt whom he knows well, perhaps that relative could plan to
spend extra time with Thomas during this important adjustment pe-
riod. If the strain of raising the three children is too much, the fam-
ily network should be carefully explored for alternative placements,
to prevent Thomas from entering foster care.
The lawyer may feel queasy not immediately advocating that
Thomas leave a home that contains vermin and seems.chaotic and
violent. Once the lawyer has made sure that the system has moved
Thomas and his mother into a situation that is safe for the time be-
ing, however, the lawyer should examine whether the impulse to
"remove Thomas" does not arise from her own anxiety to have
Thomas in a risk-free environment which requires less day-to-day
attention on the part of the lawyer. The lawyer, returning to the
seven questions to keep her honest, should continually explore ways
to preserve the mother's and the family network's primary role in
Thomas's life, to keep his family intact.
The lawyer need not limit her actions to preserving the home
only. As noted earlier, the family should also be asked to take
Thomas for medical checkups, especially if he has been near rats
and roaches. Thomas's lawyer should also ask the family doctor or
a treating professional about Thomas's sleepiness, to inquire as to
whether it is, given his level of development, of concern.
As Miguel's and Thomas's stories illustrate, the lawyer's determina-
tion of best interests always takes place in the context of the child's
wishes and the attorney's understanding of who the child is, in his con-
text. Especially for verbal clients, any best-interests analysis begins
and ends with the child's desires. Even for nonverbal, less communi-
cative clients, best-interests analysis must begin and end with the at-
torney's best understanding of who the client is, what makes her
unique, and what has been her context. Beginning and ending with a
close focus on the child will keep best-interests analysis focussed on
her needs and values, and not the attorney's own.
If noting else, this attempt at an integrated model of process and
substance for determining a child's best interests represents a clearimprovement over the total discretion model which pervades our cur-
rent lawyering for children. While I remain open to refinements and
criticisms of this first attempt at an integrated approach, I am sure that
a uniform acceptance of these prescriptions for lawyers for children
alone would immeasurably improve the quality of lawyering for chil-
dren nationwide.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
I therefore propose that the recommendations of the Fordham Con-
ference include the following:155
A. The Model Rules and the Model Code direct the lawyer for chil-
dren to conduct as traditional a lawyer-client relationship as possi-
ble, being directed wherever possible by his child client's well-
counseled wishes. The lawyer may only modify that relationship
based upon a "reasonable belief" that the client cannot ade-
quately act in the client's own interests. In order to ensure that
child clients receive the full benefit of traditional legal representa-
tion, a lawyer for children should begin a representation following
these three defaults:
1. Relationship Default:
a) A lawyer should begin each representation as she would any
other lawyer-client relationship: by meeting the client and
trying to ascertain the client's goals.
b) Because meeting the client, explaining the lawyer's role, and
listening to the client's view of the case are almost always pre-
requisite to providing the benefits of representation, the law-
yer should not deviate from this relationship default unless
the lawyer can articulate valid reasons for doing so which are
specific to the individual child client's development and cir-
cumstances and from which the child clearly benefits. Even
when the child is too young to understand who the lawyer is,
the lawyer will learn in these meetings about the child's per-
sonality, unique temperament, and physical characteristics.
2. Competency Default:
a) A child's lawyer should begin each representation with the
presumption that the client can understand the legal issues in
the case and express subjective perspectives or offer critical
information about them. To the extent that the child's devel-
opmental status creates obstacles to communication and un-
derstanding, it is part of'the lawyer's job to overcome them
creatively in order to provide the child client with the benefits
of an advocate who listens, informs, counsels, and answers
questions.
b) Because this presumption is critical to effective representa-
tion, it can only be overcome when the lawyer has independ-
ent evidence, arising outside the representation, that the child
is incapable of understanding the legal issue or expressing a
view of it.
155. The Recommendations of the Fordham Conference contain a modified version
of Part D of these Recommendations. Recommendations of the Conference, supra
note 147, part VII.A. While this model applied to best-interests decision making in
child protective contexts specifically, the conferees modified the model to describe
decision making on behalf of the child in a broad range of legal contexts. I fully
endorse the conference's broader recommendations.
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c) Even if-the competency presumption is overcome by limits on
the child's ability to communicate and understand some is-
sues, effective representation requires that the lawyer con-
tinue communicating with the client at the level of
sophistication of which the client is capable. The lawyer's de-
termination of these limits cannot be static, but must change
with the child's developmental progress through the course of
the representation. Thus, the determination that a child can-
not "adequately act in his own interest" must be made on a
decision-by-decision, not on a child-by-child, basis.
3. Advocacy Default:
a) All lawyers whose child clients can express a view relevant to
the legal representation should proceed in the first instance as
if the stated view is the goal of the representation.
b) Inviability or unlikely success of the client's stated view is not
a reason to ignore that view. As in any other representation,
the child's lawyer is charged with counseling the client about
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the client's stated
goal. If a well-counseled client decides upon an inviable goal,
the lawyer should continue to pursue it, or withhdraw from
the representation pursuant to established ethical parameters
for withhdrawal.
c) The only time the child's lawyer may advocate for a position
other than that stated by the client, is after the lawyer, based
upon independent evidence arising outside of the representa-
tion, has determined that the client's development or circum-
stances preclude the client from either expressing a position
or being effectively counseled as to the viability of the posi-
tion. Only then may the lawyer seek appointment of a guard-
ian or take other protective action pursuant to Rule 1.14(b) or
make decisions on behalf of the client pursuant to EC 7.12.
B. Lawyers who decide to advocate the express wishes of their child
clients are not free to ignore considerations of the child's best in-
terests. Best interests determinations must play a key role in all
representations of children. Because the best interests standard is
prevalent in the child client's interaction with legal, medical,
mental health, and social work institutions, the attorney cannot
carry out effective representation without developing a sophisti-
cated, principled understanding of the best interests of each client.
Every representation of a child includes the following moments at
which best interests determinations must be made:
1. In order to represent their clients in proceedings subject to a best
interests standard, children's lawyers must be able to frame the
goals of the representation in terms of the child's best interests.
2. In order to work effectively with medical, psychological, mental
health, and social work professionals, the child's attorney must
understand the various best interests standards applied by pro-
fessionals in these fields.
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3. A child's lawyer must be able to make principled best interests
determinations in those situations where the lawyer is called
upon to make day-to-day decisions on behalf of the client such as
the timing, setting, and attendees at client meetings, or the re-
lease of sensitive information to the client.
4. For clients who can communicate and be counseled effectively,
the lawyer is often asked to advise the client about the lawyer's
view of the client's best interests. As Model Rule 2.1 provides,
the lawyer, "in rendering advice may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and polit-
ical factors that may be relevant to the client's situation." The
lavyyer should also confront himself with his assessment of best
interests, to evaluate whether it is free from bias and stereotype.
5. Lawyers for clients who cannot be counseled and cannot be rep-
resented meaningfully pursuant to the three defaults must deter-
mine the child's best interests as the ultimate goal of the
representation.
C. Best interests determinations must be made in a contextual, self-
conscious, deliberate, and principled manner. Lawyers should ap-
proach the determination of best interests with extreme caution.
Nothing about legal training or traditional legal roles qualifies law-
yers to determine best interests. References to the lawyer's own
childhood, stereotypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ
from the lawyers, and the lawyer's lay understanding of child de-
velopment and children's needs should be considered highly sus-
pect bases for a best interests determination.
D. Lawyers for children who must determine their client's best inter-
ests at any given moment in the representation should employ the
following process. The lawyer should continue the analysis until
only one option remains or otherwise until the analysis is complete
at step six.
1. The process must begin with the child in her context. In making
a best interests determination, it is the lawyer's responsibility to
carry out a full, efficient, and speedy factual investigation with
the goal of achieving a detailed understanding of the child cli-
ent's unique personality, her family system, history, and daily
life. This process should include the client's own words, stories,
and desires at every possible point. Even where the lawyer has
determined that the child cannot fully understand or express
desires about the legal issues of the case, there will be very few
verbal children who cannot express some views about their own
lives. As the lawyer gathers information from her client and
other sources, the lawyer should organize those facts using de-
vices such as genograms, chronologies, and daily schedules to en-
sure that the lawyer is working from a thickly detailed view of
the child client as an unique individual.
2. Essential to the process at its beginning is also a snapshot of the
child at the moment of the determination. How is the child de-
[Vol. 641566
ROLES OF BEST INTERESTS
veloping? How is the child behaving? How is the child benefit-
ting or suffering from her current living arrangement? A lawyer
should beware of undertaking these determinations without cur-
rent contact with the client.
3. The determination must consider the options actually available
to the child. Best interests determinations are not made in a vac-
uum. A lawyer who determines that a child's current situation is
not in the child's best interest, but who does not consider
whether the resulting intervention would be any better has done
that child client no service. The lawyer must go further and con-
sider the actual alternative options to the child's current situation
in determining whether the proposed state intervention is in the
child's best interests. Where the proposed intervention results in
no improvement for the child, the child's attorney should be pre-
pared to negotiate other forms of intervention, or no interven-
tion at all.
4. In considering the actually available options that the lawyer and
client have identified, the lawyer should examine each option in
light of two important child welfare paradigms: the psychological
parent model and the family network model.
a. The psychological parent model-Does the option allow the
child to remain with or to develop a relationship with a psy-
chological parent who wants him and can provide continuity
in day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared exper-
iences? Does the option respect the child's sense of time?
Does the choice of the option recognize the limit of our pre-
dictive knowledge and confine itself to small, modest, gener-
ally short-term predictions?
b. The family network model-Does the option allow the child
to remain with or to develop a relationship with a family net-
work which provides a supportive milieu in which caregiving
is shared among several adults with whom the child is
familiar?
In assessing various options available to the child with re-
spect to these paradigms, the lawyer should be aware that
these paradigms intersect and interact in various ways. A
child may be moving from a situation that resembles one par-
adigm into a situation that resembles the other. The child
may be situated in an inadequate version of a family network,
which could use the anchor of a strong psychological parent-
like figure. A child may have lost their psychological parent,
and have only an extended family network, with no clearly
defined parental substitute identified. It will often be concep-
tually useful for the lawyer to understand the options the child
faces in these lights.
In many cases, the lawyer can combine her understanding
of the child and her context with these analytical paradigms
and reach useful conclusions about best interests. The lawyer
may, for instance, find that the child has always thrived in one
paradigm and floundered in another, or generally requires a
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hybrid. Because the paradigms seek to identify family struc-
tures that aid a child's development, the actual progress of the
client's development offers critical input in making those
determinations.
In working with analytical paradigms derived from other
fields, the lawyer should always remember that a little knowl-
edge is a dangerous thing. This step will, therefore, ordinarily
not be dispositive unless one paradigm or the other un-
,problematically accounts for much of the client's life history.
5. When this analysis becomes too complex, lawyers must con-
sult experts for guidance. Where possible, lawyers should re-
tain mental health and social work experts to aid them in
making these best interests determinations in the course of
their representations. Because much of the data upon which
the decision is based is confidential lawyer-client information,
the retained consultant is often the optimal, and only ethically
acceptable, guide. When lack of resources or other factors
make such a consultant impracticable, the lawyer may look to
experts already involved with the client, or occasionally court-
appointed experts. These latter experts, however, do not
share the lawyer's duty of advocacy with respect to the child
client's wishes and perspectives, often have other institutional
loyalties, may have important ongoing relationships with the
child that must not be damaged, or may not offer opinions to
the lawyer in a timely fashion.
6. At this point in the process of determining best interests, there
still may be no definitively preferable option for the child. If
multiple acceptable options remain, the lawyer should repre-
sent evidence and argument describing all these options to the
court while also presenting evidence and argument opposing
all rejected options. If presenting multiple options is not pos-
sible, the lawyer is then left to his discretion. In exercising
that discretion, the lawyer may be guided by a number of use-
ful considerations.
a. Where a decision in either direction can be justified, the
lawyer should err on the side of keeping the current family
structure intact, while advocating aggressively for state in-
terventions that ameliorate the worrisome conditions in the
home.
b. The decision-making process should end with the child and
his subjective perspective. During and at the end of the
exercise of his discretion, the lawyer should consider seven
questions to keep his decision child-centered and free of
his own biases:
(1) In making decisions about the representation, am I
seeing the case, as much as I can, from my client's point
of view, rather than from an adult's point of view?
(2) Does the child understand as much as I can explain
about what is happening in his case?
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(3) If my client were an adult, would I be taking the same
actions, making the same decisions and treating her in
the same way?
(4) If I decide to treat my client differently from the way I
would treat an adult in a similar situation, in what ways
will my client concretely benefit from that deviation?
Is that benefit one which I can explain to my client?
(5) Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for
the gratification of the adults in the case, and not for
the child?
(6) Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for
my own gratification, and not for that of my client?
(7) Does the representation, seen as a whole, reflect what
is unique and idiosyncratically characteristic of this
child?
CONCLUSION
Lawyers for children are ethically required to pursue as traditional
as possible a lawyer-client relationship with their clients. Even tradi-
tional lawyer-client relationships, however, require the lawyer to con-
tend with the issue of the child's best interests during important
moments in the representation. The "best interests of the child" is
often the ultimate legal standard in the pending legal proceedings.
"Best interests" is the guiding concern for most of the other profes-
sionals involved with the client. The lawyer must make day-to-day
decisions in the client's best interests, including structuring encounters
with the client, the transmission of information, and the provision of
services to the client. For clients who can benefit from counseling, the
lawyer will often be asked to outline the client's best interests. In
these cases the lawyer must confront herself with her own gut instincts
about the child's best interests to be aware of when she may-be trying
to impose her preferences and biases onto the client. For clients who
cannot be represented in an essentially traditional, client- directing
mode, the lawyer may have to determine the very objectives of the
representation with reference to the child's best interests.
Lawyers for children have tended, empirically, to rely upon their
total discretion in determining their clients's best interests in these sit-
uations. Recently, other models have begun to inform these determi-
nations. Expert opinions, by experts already involved with the client,
court-appointed experts, and lawyer-retained experts, can contribute
to the determination, where resources are available to pay them.
The interdisciplinary team of Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Gold-
stein have educated children's lawyers in psychological parenting the-
ory, directing lawyers, judges, and child welfare systems to seek the
specific placement and procedure for placement which maximizes,
in accord with the child's sense of time and on the basis of short-
term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her op-
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portunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous ba-
sis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become is
psychological parent.' 56
Peggy Davis has suggested that child welfare professionals focus in-
stead on "a supportive milieu in which caregiving is .shared among
several adults with whom the child is familiar."'157
In making a best interests determination at any given moment of
the representation, the lawyer for children should deliberate as fol-
lows: she should begin with the child-his personality, his subjective
perspective, his family history, and context. The lawyer should also
look at the child client's immediate situation-his behavior, his satis-
faction with the status quo, the progress of his development. Then the
lawyer should identify the actually available options for the child. She
should evaluate each option in light of the psychological parent and
family network paradigms to understand conceptually the options fac-
ing her client. In some cases, this analysis will identify a single best
path for pursuing the child's best interests.
Where it does not, the child's attorney should consider consulting
an expert, one whom she retains or, less frequently, an expert already
involved with the child or one appointed by the court. The lawyer
should advocate multiple acceptable options for the client, while op-
posing all rejected options. Where advocacy of multiple options is im-
possible, the lawyer must exercise her own discretion. This discretion
can be further guided by two sets of concerns. First, where alternative
paths appear equally appealing, the lawyer should err on the side that
preserves the existing family arrangements to the greatest possible de-
gree. Second, the lawyer should end the best-interests decision-mak-
ing process with the child and his subjective views, by considering
once again the seven questions to keep her honest.
This process for determining best interests will need to be continu-
ally refined, as new paradigms of child welfare emerge and as re-
sources for interdisciplinary collaborations by lawyers with other
professionals expand. This integrated model offers an important alter-
native to the prevailing total discretion, guardian ad litem, model,
which must be replaced.
156. Beyond, supra note 64, at 53.
157. Davis, The Good Mother, supra note 129, at 39.
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